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In recent years, “data privacy” has vaulted to the forefront of public 
attention. Scholars, policymakers, and the media have, nearly in unison, 
decried the lack of data privacy in the modern world. In response, they have put 
forth various proposals to remedy the situation, from the imposition of fiduciary 
obligations on technology platforms to the creation of rights to be forgotten for 
individuals. All these proposals, however, share one essential assumption: we 
must raise greater protective barriers around data. As a scholar of corporate 
finance and a scholar of corporate law, respectively, we find this assumption 
problematic. Data, after all, is simply information, and information can be used 
for beneficial purposes as well as harmful ones. Just as it can be used to 
discriminate and to embarrass, information can be used to empower and to 
improve. And while data privacy is often pitched at ending unauthorized data 
sharing, it all too often leads simply to the end of data sharing, period. This 
comes at a cost. Data silos can inhibit consumer choice, protect the positions of 
powerful incumbents, and reduce the efficiency of markets. The best example of 
these costs comes from the financial industry. For more than a century, banks 
and other financial institutions have built their information technology systems 
to keep financial records as private and nonshareable as possible. While security 
concerns can be a primary reason for such closed systems, banks also 
understand that financial data is an advantage that can protect them from 
market entry and competition. Banks can hold up consumers with unfavorable 
rates and inferior products as a result, and a set of market failures make it 
difficult for consumers to opt out. First, information asymmetries between 
consumers and financial institutions are large and difficult to resolve. Second, 
search and switch costs—the difficulty of finding out more information about 
the risks and benefits of financial products and of switching to a better financial 
service—are high in the financial industry. Finally, individuals struggle to take 
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advantage of even simple financial strategies to save, borrow, and invest. Data 
sharing can help resolve these problems. The emergence of a new regulatory and 
technological framework called “open banking” raises the possibility of 
consumers being able to task trusted intermediaries with automatically 
analyzing their financial data, nudging them to achieve their goals, and 
switching them to better products, all in order to reduce the substantial 
inefficiencies in their financial lives. There is one problem, however. A 
combination of market failure and regulatory ambiguity has led to a situation 
in which data is limited, siloed, and inaccessible, thereby preventing 
individuals from using their data in efficient ways. Ultimately, this Article 
contends, resolving these problems will require us to replace the clarion call of 
“data privacy” with a new, more comprehensive concept, that of “data 
autonomy”—the ability of individuals to have control over their data. Data 
autonomy balances the need for data to be protected and secure with the need 
for it to be accessible and shareable. In this Article, we lay out a set of key 
principles that grant individuals a legal right to data autonomy, including a 
right of ownership over data, as well as obligations on institutions to safely 
share standardized and interoperable data with third parties that consumers 
so choose. Perhaps counterintuitively, the only way of expanding consumer 
welfare and protection today is by breaking down the barriers of data privacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, “data privacy” has vaulted to the forefront of 
public attention. Major newspapers have written exposés about the 
myriad ways in which technology companies are exploiting and 
monetizing our data.1 Congress has held hearings to question tech 
CEOs on the data practices of their businesses.2 And regulators have 
begun to turn their attention to the topic as well, issuing fines and 
enacting rules to both punish and prevent shoddy data privacy 
protections.3 All these efforts have been driven by the widespread 
perception that the pervasive use of technology in today’s world has 
seriously harmed the legitimate privacy interests of citizens. 
In response to these concerns, scholars have proposed a variety 
of reforms. Some have argued that we need to impose fiduciary duties 
on technology platforms, requiring them to act in the best interest of 
their users.4 Others have argued that we need to create a new “right to 
be forgotten,” allowing users to force internet companies to remove 
 
 1. See Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero 
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/ 
location-tracking-cell-phone.html [https://perma.cc/7DN4-BS8B]; Sam Schechner & Mark Secada, 
You Give Apps Sensitive Personal Information. Then They Tell Facebook., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 
2019, 11:07 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-give-apps-sensitive-personal-information-
then-they-tell-facebook-11550851636 [https://perma.cc/V4A7-67H4]; Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Found 
Your Data. It’s for Sale., WASH. POST (July 18, 2019, 7:00 AM CDT), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/18/i-found-your-data-its-sale/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4BED-LUDA]; Carly Minsky, Is Consumer Protection Legislation Fit for Purpose?, FIN. TIMES 
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/3901dd14-ca55-11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0 [https:// 
perma.cc/5S7S-JTC5]. 
 2. See Kevin Roose & Cecilia Kang, Mark Zuckerberg Testifies on Facebook Before Skeptical 
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/politics/ 
zuckerberg-facebook-senate-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/P3UP-9ZR9]; Ryan Tracy, Tech Giants 
Draw Fire in Congress, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2019, 7:05 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
congress-puts-big-tech-in-crosshairs-11563311754 [https://perma.cc/QHK5-WVWP]. 
 3. See Emily Glazer, Ryan Tracy & Jeff Horwitz, FTC Approves Roughly $5 Billion Facebook 
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2019, 6:43 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-approves-
roughly-5-billion-facebook-settlement-11562960538 [https://perma.cc/FJT8-RVKH]; Craig A. 
Newman, The S.E.C. Dusts Off a Never-Used Cyber Enforcement Tool, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/business/dealbook/voya-sec-cyber.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9NL8-ZEZH]; Tony Romm, DOJ Issues New Warning to Big Tech: Data and Privacy Could Be 
Competition Concerns, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2019, 2:22 PM CST), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/08/doj-issues-latest-warning-big-tech-data-privacy-
could-be-competition-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/3RUN-JHTP]. 
 4. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1183, 1205 (2016); Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for 
[https://perma.cc/UW6W-FDYN]; Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make 
Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ 
archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/ [https://perma.cc/Y28R-QJF8]. 
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personal information from their websites.5 Still others assert that we 
need to grant individuals broader rights to sue technology companies 
for data privacy violations.6 The assumption underlying these proposals 
is that we need to raise greater protective barriers around data. 
As scholars of corporate finance and corporate law, we find this 
assumption troubling, or at least incomplete. Data, after all, is simply 
information. Information can be used for any number of purposes, some 
of which are problematic, of course, but many of which are in fact quite 
desirable. Just as information can be used to discriminate and 
embarrass, it can also be used to empower and improve.7 Indeed, one of 
the core goals of financial regulation is to encourage, and in some cases 
require, the disclosure of useful information in order to make markets 
fairer and more efficient.8 Data sharing, thus, is a tremendously 
powerful tool for social good.9   
This is not to say that data privacy is not valuable as well. It 
certainly is, and any well-designed regulation needs to be deeply 
concerned with protecting it.10 But the ability to share information is 
just as important as the ability to hide it. Too often, data privacy 
 
 5. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 
WIS. L. REV. 321 (calling for mechanisms to remove criminal convictions from private background 
check databases after records are sealed or expunged); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, 
The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 43 (2013); Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 
90 N.C. L. REV. 1643 (2012). 
 6. See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109 (2014); Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The 
New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 235 (2012); Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 2025, 2052 (2014); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 
109 (2019). 
 7. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and 
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A 
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, Examined 
Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Daniel J. 
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006). 
 8. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 334 (1979); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and 
the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984); Paul G. 
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1047–
48 (1995). But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 651 (2011). 
 9. On the importance of information sharing for empowering better decisionmaking and 
more efficient transactions, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970); Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 
Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing, 90 Q.J. ECON. 651, 664 (1976); Michael 
Spence, Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs, 90 Q.J. ECON. 
51, 52 (1976). 
 10. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1193 (1998); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000); James P. 
Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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reforms have tended to favor the latter value over the former.11 While 
they have been aimed at preventing unauthorized data sharing, they 
have often simply prevented data sharing at all.12 This comes at a cost. 
Data silos⎯where data is stored by a company, but in a way that it is 
inconvenient to access or use⎯can inhibit consumer choice, protect the 
positions of powerful incumbents, and reduce the efficiency of 
markets.13 We need to find a better balance.   
This Article explores these problems by examining the world of 
financial data, an area that has seen an explosion of interest in recent 
years from Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and, just as importantly, 
Washington.14 Despite the fact that the financial sector plays a very 
important role in the economy, efficiency within the sector has 
remained remarkably stagnant over the last century. The low level of 
productivity growth can be traced to weak competition in the financial 
sector, as incumbents enjoy oligopoly rents and underinvest in 
technological innovation.15 Three main reasons can explain this lack of 
competition. First, the financial regulatory environment is complex and 
fragmented, causing high regulatory compliance costs and high barriers 
to entry. Second, banks hold up consumers with expensive and lower 
quality services, as information asymmetries between consumers and 
financial institutions are large and hard to resolve, and the search and 
switch costs involved in identifying and comparing financial products 
 
 11. See discussion infra Section II.E (examining how regulatory solutions to the issues 
identified have played out in other jurisdictions).  
 12. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, for example, contains a broadly constructed privacy rule, 
prohibiting banks from “disclos[ing] to a nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal 
information [about a consumer],” but also includes an exception providing that the requirements 
for data privacy do not apply for data sharing “with the consent or at the direction of the consumer.”  
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a), (e)(2). 
 13. See discussion infra Section I.A (exploring theories that explain why the financial sector 
has made little progress with respect to efficiency despite massive technological advances). 
 14. See Masters of the Universe: The Rise of the Financial Machines, ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 
2019), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/10/03/the-rise-of-the-financial-machines [https:// 
perma.cc/VUZ6-RDAT]; Rochelle Toplensky, Data and Deregulation Fuel the Global Fintech Boom, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2019, 5:38 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/data-and-deregulation-fuel-
the-global-fintech-boom-11574419137 [https://perma.cc/YA8N-8FUP]; Emily Birnbaum, 
Lawmakers Call for FTC Probe into Top Financial Data Aggregator, HILL (Jan. 17, 2020, 11:13 
AM EST), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/478766-lawmakers-call-for-ftc-probe-into-top-
financial-data-aggregator [https://perma.cc/Y528-879T]. 
 15. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. 
ECON. REV. 50, 76 (1991); Victor Stango, Pricing with Consumer Switching Costs: Evidence from 
the Credit Card Market, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 475, 489 (2002); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation 
More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 242–48 (2018) [hereinafter Van Loo, 
Making Innovation More Competitive]; Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, 
Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 213 (2019) [hereinafter Van Loo, 
Broadening Consumer Law]; Carin van der Cruijsen & Maaike Diepstraten, Banking Products: 
You Can Take Them with You, So Why Don’t You?, 52 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 123, 124 (2017). 
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are high.16 Finally, individuals often do not act as purely rational 
decisionmakers in their financial lives.17 They fail to save, they fail to 
diversify, and they fail to take advantage of simple strategies that could 
substantially improve their financial positions.18   
Data can help solve these problems. Over the last decade, a 
number of financial technology (“fintech”) companies have sprung up, 
better serving consumers by automating and optimizing financial 
transactions.19 Using a combination of big data, artificial intelligence, 
and mobile computing, these fintech companies have attempted to 
resolve the inefficiencies that bedevil consumers in the market.20 They 
have both the expertise and the incentives to learn about consumer 
preferences, search for information about financial products, and take 
advantage of price differentials.21 Their innovations have the  
potential to dramatically improve individuals’ access to beneficial 
banking services. 
But the promise of fintech has been held back by one essential 
feature of today’s financial landscape: the lack of data. While financial 
institutions create and manage enormous amounts of data on a daily 
 
 16. See Liran Haim, Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy in Financial Markets, 32 J.L. & 
COM. 23, 36–44 (2013); Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft 
Protection, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1146–47 (2012). 
 17. See Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and 
Arm’s-Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367 (1992); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three 
Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002); Edward 
B. Rock, Foxes and Hen Houses?: Personal Trading by Mutual Fund Managers, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1601, 1621–22 (1995); Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement 
Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 41 (2015); James J. 
Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, For Better or for Worse: Default 
Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81, 81–82 
(David A. Wise ed., 2004); Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your 
Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 774 
(2000); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic 
Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276–77 (1991). 
 18. See discussion infra Section I.B (explaining that although the arrival of fintech and big 
data have dramatically altered the amount of information available to investors, the U.S. financial 
sector has not yet seen efficiency gains). 
 19. See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 863 (2019); Benjamin 
P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisers Rescue the Retail 
Market?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 97–100 (2018). 
 20. See Christopher G. Bradley, Fintech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 63 (2018); 
Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 241–44 
(2019); William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1173–74 (2018) 
[hereinafter Magnuson, Regulating Fintech]; William Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the 
Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 159, 163–64 (2018) [hereinafter Magnuson,  
Financial Regulation]. 
 21. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 833–36 (describing how AI can leverage dispersed data to 
make more effective decisions for consumers). 
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basis, individuals struggle to access and share that data with others.22 
A combination of market failure and regulatory ambiguity makes it 
difficult, and sometimes impossible, for consumers to grant fintech 
companies access to their financial data. This has led to a situation in 
which data is limited, siloed, and inaccessible, with large financial 
institutions possessing tremendously valuable data but failing to share 
it with others.23 Again, there are perfectly valid reasons why financial 
institutions might be hesitant to do so. They worry about privacy 
violations, cybersecurity risks, and liability exposures, all of which are 
significant.24 But without control of their own financial data, 
individuals struggle to overcome the many obstacles to efficient 
financial decisionmaking. 
This Article argues that resolving these problems will require us 
to replace the clarion call of “data privacy” with a new, more 
comprehensive concept—“data autonomy.” Data autonomy balances the 
need for data to be protected and secure with the need for it to be 
accessible and shareable. It grants individuals a set of rights over their 
data that wrests control over data back from the large institutions that, 
until now, have maintained a vice grip over it. And while data autonomy 
requires important changes in legal rights and responsibilities, it is not 
entirely without precedent. It is largely consistent with a wave of new 
regulations being put in place across the globe, often referred to as 
“open banking” rules, that seek to address the lack of data sharing  
in financial services. Perhaps counterintuitively, the only way of 
ensuring consumer protection today is by breaking down the barriers of  
 
 22. See Nathaniel Popper, Banks and Tech Firms Battle Over Something Akin to Gold: Your 
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/business/dealbook/banks-
and-tech-firms-battle-over-something-akin-to-gold-your-data.html [https://perma.cc/7Y4C-SP7W] 
(suggesting that big banks limit data access to avoid ceding control over that data); AnnaMaria 
Andriotis & Emily Glazer, Facebook and Financial Firms Tussled for Years Over Access to User 
Data, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2018, 5:30 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-sought-
access-to-financial-firms-customer-data-1537263000 [https://perma.cc/DY2J-DX6U] (describing 
banks’ hesitancy to give Facebook access to consumers’ financial information). 
 23. See JPMorgan’s Clampdown on Data Puts Silicon Valley Apps on Alert, AM. BANKER 
(Mar. 26, 2019, 9:18 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/jpmorgans-clampdown-on-
data-puts-silicon-valley-apps-on-alert [https://perma.cc/5WAF-73ZW]; Laura Noonan, JPMorgan 
to Ban Fintech Apps from Using Customer Passwords, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2020), https:// 
www.ft.com/content/93dcfc52-210b-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b [https://perma.cc/L9AM-LJ3R]. 
 24. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, REPORT ON 
OPEN BANKING AND APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACES 13–15 (2019), https://www.bis.org/ 
bcbs/publ/d486.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGL3-MWBF]; Open Banking, Open Liability: Accountability 
Issues for Open Banking APIs, ASHURST (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-
insights/legal-updates/open-banking-open-liability-accountability-issues-for-open-banking-apis 
[https://perma.cc/J3EH-FA9T].  
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data privacy.25 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes the 
competition problems that beset the financial industry, with a 
particular focus on services for consumers. It then turns to the ways in 
which innovative, data-focused fintech could help improve competition 
within the industry and provide better results for consumers. Finally, 
it explores the current barriers, both market-based and law-based, that 
inhibit greater competition. 
Part II sets forth a pathway to reform. It explores how a variety 
of legal changes aimed at creating true data autonomy for individuals 
would help resolve inefficiencies in the sector. It argues that these 
reforms would include rights of ownership and access to personal 
financial data, as well as obligations on financial institutions to 
maintain personal financial data in interoperable and secure formats. 
Finally, it explores how such “open banking” structures have been 
implemented in other countries and the lessons that can be drawn from 
their experiences. 
Part III considers the broader implications of shifting from a 
privacy-focused conception of data to an autonomy-focused one. Giving 
individuals control over their data will raise new risks and concerns, 
and regulators will need to be wary of emerging practices that might 
exploit or defraud newly empowered consumers. Part III focuses on 
three areas that will require special vigilance. First, regulators will 
need to develop robust measures for ensuring that individuals consent 
in meaningful and thoughtful ways before their data is shared with 
others. Second, regulators will need to be wary of antitrust violations, 
as the diffusion of competitively sensitive data may lead to collusion 
between competitors. Finally, regulators will need to be mindful of the 
problem of cost, as the development and maintenance of comprehensive 
data platforms will be expensive and, thus, may spur further incentives 
to monetize data in problematic ways.  
A final caveat: lest we be misunderstood, we do not believe that 
data autonomy as a concept is opposed to data privacy. A world in which 
individuals do not have the ability to keep their information, financial 
and otherwise, out of public view is a dangerous and unappealing one. 
We do not advocate for one. Instead, we view this Article as an effort to 
highlight the ways in which data privacy can be used as an excuse for 
resisting innovation and stifling competition. Data autonomy, rightly 
understood, restores to the individual the right both to hide and to 
 
 25. See Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of 
Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1583 (2019) (arguing that privacy undermines consumer 
protection and other regulatory goals). 
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reveal, to confide and to disclose. We believe it better protects 
individuals in an increasingly data-dependent world. 
I. THE ROLE OF DATA IN FINANCE 
Finance suffers from a competition problem. Despite the clear 
need for better products to facilitate consumer wealth and security, 
innovation within the sector has lagged, at least partially because there 
are few incentives for traditional actors to innovate. Fintech startups, 
on the other hand, have strong incentives to innovate but lack the 
means to do so, primarily because they struggle to access the data they 
need to provide better services. This Part explores the structural causes 
of the lack of competition within the financial sector, with a particular 
focus on consumer banking. It then discusses the ways in which data 
could be used to mitigate or solve these problems. Finally, it describes 
how market failure and legal uncertainty have raised obstacles to 
greater use of data to empower individuals and improve financial 
services. It concludes by discussing potential avenues for reform. 
A. The Competition Problem in Finance  
Finance plays a crucial role in the economy. Through their 
provision of credit, liquidity, and payment and investment services, 
financial institutions allocate resources to their best uses, thereby 
making markets more efficient.26 In economic terms, banks and other 
financial institutions intermediate between borrowers and savers, 
providing the former with capital to invest and the latter with 
investment opportunities.27 This is a crucial role that has led financial 
institutions to dominating positions in the U.S. economy. Finance is 
now one of the largest sectors in the United States, contributing 7.4 
percent of GDP in 2018.28 The financial sector’s importance to the 
economy also appears to be growing. In 1880, the quantity of 
intermediated assets was approximately equal to GDP, whereas today, 
 
 26. See EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 3–15 (1972); Joseph 
E. Stiglitz, The Allocation Role of the Stock Market: Pareto Optimality and Competition, 36 J. FIN. 
235, 235 (1981); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).  
 27. See FAMA & MILLER, supra note 26, at 3–15. 
 28. This number includes both finance and insurance. See Int’l Trade Admin., Indus. & 
Analysis Unit, Financial Services Spotlight: The Financial Services Industry in the United States, 
SELECTUSA, https://www.selectusa.gov/financial-services-industry-united-states (last visited Oct. 
4, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7BPC-GW3A]. 
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it is four times GDP.29 The income of financial institutions has grown 
proportionately. The revenues of financial intermediaries increased 
from 2 percent of GDP in 1880 to 7.4 percent of GDP in 2018.30    
Despite the growing size and profits of financial institutions, 
efficiency within the sector has remained remarkably stagnant. One 
common measure of efficiency within the financial sector is the ratio of 
the income of financial intermediaries to the quantity of intermediated 
assets.31 By representing the unit cost of intermediating one dollar of 
assets, the ratio is thought to be an accurate way of understanding the 
efficiency of financial institutions in performing their key function.32 It 
turns out that the intermediation ratio within the financial sector has 
remained stable at around 1.5 to 2 percent for over a century.33 This is 
a striking statistic. The world has undergone tremendous technological 
change during this time, from the invention of computers to the creation 
of the internet. And yet, despite all these technological advances⎯many 
of which fundamentally altered the way that financial services 
work⎯there has been no increase in efficiency, with the unit cost today 
roughly the same as it was around 1900. The stability of the ratio is 
particularly striking given that almost all other sectors in the economy 
today are much more efficient than they were a century ago.34  
This raises an obvious question. Why has finance not grown 
more efficient over time? While many theories have been asserted, two 
theories (one market-based and one law-based) have gained widespread 
acceptance. The first theory holds that the lack of efficiency gains in the 
financial sector can be explained as a result of the excess rents that 
incumbent financial institutions extract from their customers (so-called 
“hold-up” costs).35 Banks use two main channels to hold up their 
customers and charge them more than a competitive market would 
sustain: (i) informational advantages and (ii) switching costs.36  
 
 29. See Thomas Philippon, Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the 
Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1408, 1411 (2015). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1409. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 1412. 
 34. See id. at 1434 (noting that although in the retail and wholesale sectors, “IT investment 
coincides with lower prices and lower (nominal) GDP shares,” the inverse is true in finance). 
 35. See GERALD EPSTEIN & JUAN ANTONIO MONTECINO, ROOSEVELT INST., OVERCHARGED: 
THE HIGH COST OF HIGH FINANCE 2, 16–19 (2016), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/RI-Overcharged-201606.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NZB-J8S6] (“[E]conomic 
rents are the incomes that some individuals or institutions receive over and above what would be 
required to incentivize them to engage in a given economic activity.”). 
 36. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 218 (2008) (informational 
advantages); Oren-Bar Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2010) 
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First, the process of lending to borrowers is fraught with 
asymmetric information, where the lender has significantly less 
information than the borrower about the credit quality of the 
borrower.37 This is a classic example of adverse selection that can lead 
to market breakdowns.38 Banks thus invest a significant amount of 
resources in assessing the creditworthiness of individuals in order to 
make more accurate loans. But once banks acquire this information, 
they can then charge borrowers rates that are higher than what the 
borrowers would pay if asymmetric information were not present. After 
all, even if consumers are overcharged by a bank, they will find it 
difficult to instead reapply for a loan at a different bank, because doing 
so is often interpreted by other banks as a negative signal of their 
creditworthiness. This is a typical information hold-up problem.39 
Another avenue for holding up customers is through bundling 
services.40 Most financial institutions today offer a variety of services, 
from checking and savings accounts to brokerage services, from bill 
payment solutions to credit cards.41 Many consumers choose to use their 
bank for several or even all of these services. While this may be 
convenient for customers, it also introduces a large transaction cost for 
moving to a new bank. The search and switch costs are high and, thus, 
serve as a strong preference for the status quo.42   
The second explanation for the inefficiency of the financial sector 
focuses on the role of regulation.43 In particular, it asserts that the 
complex and fragmented regulatory environment for finance creates 
 
(switching costs); Daniel Hemel, Note, Regulatory Consolidation and Cross-Border Coordination: 
Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 28 YALE J. ON REGUL. 213, 222 (2011) (switching costs). 
 37. See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: 
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 
1495–96 (2006). 
 38. See Akerlof, supra note 9, at 493 (describing adverse selection in the insurance industry 
as occurring when healthy policyholders discontinue coverage, causing the insurer to bear an 
increased proportion of risks and higher claim costs). 
 39. See Rajan, supra note 17, at 1367–68 (explaining that because bank financing requires 
firms to share information with the banks, “firms forsake informed and seemingly more efficient 
sources of debt finance [from banks] to borrow from less informed arm’s-length sources”). 
 40. See Aluma Zernik, Overdrafts: When Markets, Consumers, and Regulators Collide, 26 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (2018). 
 41. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 2 (Feb. 26, 2019). 
 42. See Chris M. Wilson, Market Frictions: A Unified Model of Search Costs and Switching 
Costs, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1070 (2012) (explaining how high costs constrain the ability of 
customers to change suppliers). 
 43. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary 
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REGUL. 253, 270 (2007); Henry N. Butler & 
Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
677, 679 (1988); Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to 
Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 39, 75 (2009). 
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large barriers to entry in the sector, thereby impeding potential 
competitors from introducing change.44 Currently, a multitude of 
federal and state regulatory agencies possess overlapping oversight of 
the U.S. financial system. Banks and credit unions are regulated by the 
Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and the National 
Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), as well as by state agencies, 
while broker-dealers and market intermediaries are overseen by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, numerous self-regulatory organizations (e.g. 
FINRA, NFA, FASB), and state regulators.45 Institutions wanting to 
become banks must first receive charters, a process that is lengthy, 
expensive, and uncertain.46 The complexity of this arrangement, as well 
as the overlapping compliance requirements, discourages new and 
innovative companies from entering the financial sector.47 As a result, 
incumbent financial institutions can enjoy an oligopolistic competitive 
environment with large market power, excess rents, and low pressure 
to innovate.48    
A final and related point is that all of these factors have played 
a role in contributing to rising public distrust of financial institutions. 
In a recent survey by the Reputation Institute, the banking sector 
ranked fifteenth out of sixteen industries for general reputation, only 
barely edging out the telecommunications industry for the worst 
reputation.49 A recent Gallup poll found that sixty-two percent of 
respondents had only some, very little, or no confidence in banks.50 The 
tech industry, on the other hand, despite all its recent criticism, 
generally inspires greater levels of trust in consumers, even with 
respect to the provision of financial products.51  
 
 44. See Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 587–92 (2019). 
 45. See Lee Hudson Teslik, The U.S. Financial Regulatory System, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELS. (Oct. 1, 2008), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-financial-regulatory-system [https:// 
perma.cc/7QG6-MWAP]. 
 46. See Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive, supra note 15, at 260. 
 47. See Allen, supra note 44, at 591. 
 48. See Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust 
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 242–43 (2017) (describing 
an analogous phenomenon in the context of unionized labor).  
 49. Alan Kline, 2019 Reputation Rankings: The Biggest Movers, AM. BANKER (June 30, 2019, 
9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/list/2019-reputation-rankings-the-biggest-movers 
[https://perma.cc/L6QX-FEYA]. 
 50. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx (last visited Dec. 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6RQT-KVLU]. 
 51. See, e.g., Statista Rsch. Dep’t, United States: Is Your Overall Opinion of Google as a 
Provider of Financial Services Positive, Neutral or Negative?, STATISTA (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/433041/united-states-google-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/DBF5-
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In summary, the financial sector is large, profitable, inefficient, 
and untrusted. It is thus an obvious target for technological disruption. 
As Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, warned his 
shareholders in 2014: “Silicon Valley is coming.”52      
B. The Promise of Fintech 
In recent years, a number of fintech companies have sprung up 
to attempt to disrupt the financial sector using new technologies and 
tapping into new markets.53 These companies have tended to focus on 
addressing two of the most severe financial frictions: asymmetric 
information and switching costs. By using technology to automate and 
improve decisionmaking, they promise to lower frictions in the financial 
sector and bring more competition into the market for financial 
products.54 Among other things, it is hoped that they will expand access 
to and usage of financial products and provide cheaper, more 
convenient, and better targeted financial service products.55   
The explosion in fintech investment over the last decade has 
been spurred by several technological breakthroughs.56 Nowadays, 
machines can replicate many intellectual tasks, including search and 
planning, reasoning and knowledge representation, perception, natural 
language processing, and social interactions.57 These advancements 
have transformed traditional enterprises and created new business 
opportunities in the financial service industry.58 They have also paved 
the way to entirely new financial services across the globe: marketplace 
lending, equity crowdfunding, robo-advising, cryptocurrencies, 
blockchains, algorithmic trading, mobile payments, and  
person-to-person cross-border remittances all emerged out of  
fintech innovations.59  
One particularly promising sector of the fintech market focuses 
on the better usage of data. One way to reduce information asymmetry, 
of course, is to collect, analyze, and share more information. And there 
are tremendous amounts of relevant data to be analyzed. Indeed, 
 
E7GN] (presenting survey results where ninety-five percent of respondents reported either a 
positive or neutral view of Google as a financial services provider). 
 52. See Jamie Dimon, Letter to Shareholders, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 29 (2015) 
[https://perma.cc/FV22-CC7G]. 
 53. See Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, supra note 20, at 1173–87. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 20, at 264–78. 
 57. Id. at 269–75. 
 58. Id. at 272–78. 
 59. Id. 
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nowadays, most economic and social activities are digitalized in some 
form. Around 33 zettabytes (1021) of data were created, captured, or 
replicated in 2018, and the number continues to grow, more than 
doubling every other year.60 Furthermore, the ability to analyze and 
process that data is growing as well. Under the well-known Moore’s law, 
computing and storage power doubles roughly every eighteen to twenty-
four months.61 Just as importantly, advancements in data analytics, 
such as machine learning and neural networks, allow companies to 
analyze greater amounts of data more accurately and in a shorter 
amount of time.62  
The arrival of big data means that lenders and investors now 
have a much greater amount of information than in the past to decide 
on the creditworthiness of borrowers or the expected return of an 
investment.63 For example, bank account transactions include a trove 
of data useful for lending decisions, from disposable income to cash flow 
stability.64 Sharing such information with lenders could allow 
borrowers to get loans on better terms by providing the lenders with 
greater security about the borrowers’ financial behavior.65 A more 
comprehensive use of data might lead to even greater efficiency gains. 
By aggregating and merging disparate data, companies could more 
accurately understand, predict, and optimize consumer demand and 
use of financial products.66 For example, fintech companies could 
manage the personal finance of an individual by analyzing their credit 
card transactions, bank direct deposits, spending patterns, investment 
returns, and risk profiles.67 
 
 60. See DAVID REINSEL, JOHN GANTZ & JOHN RYDNING, THE DIGITIZATION OF THE WORLD: 
FROM EDGE TO CORE 3, 6 (2018), https://www.seagate.com/files/www-content/our-story/trends/ 
files/idc-seagate-dataage-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2HJ-6S5Z]. 
 61. It should be noted that in the last few years, a growing number of commentators have 
called into question whether Moore’s law still holds.  See Shara Tibken, CES 2019: Moore’s Law Is 
Dead, Says Nvidia’s CEO, CNET (Jan. 9, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/moores-law-
is-dead-nvidias-ceo-jensen-huang-says-at-ces-2019/ [https://perma.cc/9VY2-B5YN]. 
 62. William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV.  337,  
339–40 (2020). 
 63. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014); Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer BitCredit and Fintech 
Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781, 820 (2018); Matthew A. Bruckner, Regulating Fintech Lending, 
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., June 2018, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Bruckner, Regulating]; 
Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 5 (2018) [hereinafter Bruckner, The Promise and Perils]. 
 64. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 63, at 5. 
 65. Cf. id. at 8–18 (describing drawbacks of the “black box” created by the credit scoring 
system in which opacity undermines fairness and efficiency). 
 66. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 817–18. 
 67. Id. at 826–30. 
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Despite the great promise of fintech and its data-focused 
approach to finance, however, there is little empirical evidence that, at 
least so far, it has led to greater efficiency within the United States. 
While technology is drastically changing the business models of most 
industries, from media and telecommunication to retail, the adoption of 
new technologies in the broader U.S. financial sector, and the financial 
inclusion and efficiency that comes with it, is still limited.68 In a recent 
survey of fintech adoption rates, the U.S. market ranks twenty-fourth 
out of twenty-seven countries.69 
The low level of fintech adoption in the U.S. financial sector can 
be explained partially as a result of the unique nature of the U.S. 
market. In particular, the U.S. financial sector has the odd feature of 
being both fragmented and concentrated. This strange structure has 
made it especially resistant to competition. Let us focus first on its 
fragmentation. As of 2018, there were more than 4,700 FDIC-insured 
commercial banks with over 81,000 bank branches.70 This is an 
enormous number of firms and is perhaps best understood by 
examining it in comparison with other countries. The United Kingdom 
has only three hundred banks.71 Canada has only eighty-eight.72 Europe 
has around two-thirds the number of banks per capita that the United 
States does.73 The fragmentation of the U.S. market might seem to 
suggest that the banking industry should be highly competitive, as 
oligopolistic behavior is usually associated with high industry 
concentration. But this is where the concentration of the market 
becomes relevant. Over the last twenty years, the banking industry has 
in fact been undergoing a significant consolidation, with a decline of 
over forty percent in the total number of banks, accompanied by a rise 
in the share of very large “supermarket” financial institutions: the five 
 
 68. See ERNST & YOUNG, GLOBAL FINTECH ADOPTION INDEX 2019, at 6–7 (2019), 
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/financial-services/ey-global-
fintech-adoption-index-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSS2-NWKH]. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See F. Norrestad, Number of FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks in the United States From 
2002 to 2018, STATISTA (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/184536/number-of-fdic-
insured-us-commercial-bank-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/44R7-WYE7]; F. Norrestad, Number 
of FDIC-Insured Commercial Bank Offices in the U.S. 2000-2019, STATISTA (Nov. 10, 2020), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/193044/number-of-fdic-insured-us-commercial-bank-offices/ 
[https://perma.cc/H4U9-SBYE]. 
 71. Overview of Banks in the UK, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/ 
resources/careers/companies/top-banks-in-the-uk/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
33HF-EVSM]. 
 72. Focus: Fast Facts About the Canadian Banking System, CANADIAN BANKERS ASS’N (Aug. 
26, 2020), https://cba.ca/fast-facts-the-canadian-banking-system [https://perma.cc/7SZ6-YNQ4]. 
 73. See Commercial Bank Branches (Per 100,000 Adults), WORLD BANK, https:// 
data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5 (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
R2SP-AR3F]. 
          
342 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2:327 
largest banks in the United States accounted for around twenty-eight 
percent of total assets of large commercial banks in 2000 but now 
account for forty-seven percent.74 The banking industry, thus, despite 
its fragmentation, is also quite concentrated. It has a large number of 
very small banks and a small number of very large ones. While the 
small ones struggle to find the resources needed to innovate, the large 
ones have limited incentives to do so due to their oligopoly rents and 
government guarantees as systemically important financial 
institutions (sometimes colloquially known as “too-big-to-fail” firms). 
This is a recipe for a competition-resistant market.  
This problem, of course, creates an even greater opportunity for 
fintech companies. If small banks lack the ability to innovate, and large 
banks lack the incentives to do so, fintech companies have both. If they 
can gain access to the financial data of consumers, they should be able 
to provide better services at lower cost than other financial institutions 
and, in doing so, trigger greater competition within the sector. But the 
fintech industry relies on one key input: data. And as the next Section 
explores, data has become increasingly hard to access and share. 
C. The Data Problem  
For centuries, financial institutions have built their information 
systems to prevent loss, either in the form of theft or, more recently, 
cybersecurity breaches. Even today, the core banking systems of many 
U.S. banks rely on mainframe-based transaction systems, introduced in 
the 1970s, to allow centralized processing of large volumes of 
transactions with reduced downtime and high data security. But this 
core banking system is now antiquated and unable to keep up with the 
needs of the modern financial system. Over the last decade, fintech 
companies have introduced new technologies (such as screen-scraping) 
aimed at surmounting these problems and at accessing bank accounts 
to retrieve the data they need. In recent years, however, financial 
institutions have responded by introducing new barriers around 
consumer data, again making it difficult for consumers to access and 
share their data with others.75 In some cases, banks have banned 
customers from sharing their passwords with third-party fintech 
 
 74. See Large Commercial Banks Statistical Release, FED. RSRV. BD., https:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/ (last updated June 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JYA4-
TT5D] (identifying the five largest banks); Peter Eavis & Keith Collins, The Banks Changed. 
Except for All the Ways They’re the Same., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2018/09/12/business/big-investment-banks-dodd-frank.html [https://perma.cc/FA7N-
9MHT] (showing concentration of the banking industry over time). 
 75. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 838–39. 
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companies.76 In others, they have introduced platform changes that 
shut out fintech companies.77 In still others, they have required fintech 
companies to enter into burdensome data sharing agreements before 
allowing consumers to share data with them.78 More generally, banks 
have been slow to adapt their technological infrastructure to allow 
consumers to access and share financial data with other parties.79 
If this were a more competitive sector, one might expect that the 
market would help resolve the problem. If consumers truly valued the 
ability to share their financial data with third parties, they might 
choose banks or other financial institutions that provided that service. 
After all, in functioning markets, when there is a demand for a specific 
service, it is generally expected that, where feasible, a market will arise 
to supply it.80 But, as mentioned before, the financial sector is far from 
a perfect market. Several hurdles prevent a market for data sharing to 
arise naturally. First, because search and switch costs are large in the 
banking sector, consumers may well not shift to banks that spring up 
offering better services.81 Consumers, after all, use the same financial 
institution for a multitude of financial transactions, from direct deposits 
to paying bills and mortgages, and moving all these services to a 
competing bank is time-consuming and expensive.82 Second, until a 
sufficient number of institutions allow data sharing, the value of data 
sharing by a single institution is muted.83 In other words, there are 
strong network effects to data sharing and, until a network develops, 
there will be few incentives for individual banks to suddenly offer it.84 
For example, personal financial management tools are valuable only if 
they aggregate all the financial information scattered among all 
financial institutions. Potential market entrants are thus waiting for 
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BANKER (Sept. 19, 2019, 7:00 AM EDT), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/wells-fargo-
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 79. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 838–39 (noting other examples of banks restricting 
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 81. See discussion supra Section I.A (noting that the cost of switching service providers 
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 82. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 83. See Peter Zhegin, Data Network Effects for an Artificial Intelligence Startup, MEDIUM 
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 84. See id. 
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more data to become available and for the regulatory environment to 
become clearer regarding data access and sharing. Consumers, in turn, 
are waiting for market entrants before they switch banks, a classic 
chicken-and-egg problem. 
Furthermore, incumbent financial institutions have a strong 
interest in preventing data sharing in the first place.85 Banks have little 
incentive to share their data with third parties if they are not being paid 
to do so, as customer data is valuable and gives banks a competitive 
advantage over others.86 Relinquishing it to third parties erodes banks’ 
competitive position. Just as importantly, the third-party fintech 
companies that gain access to the data may well use it in ways that 
harm the bank that gave it. They might, for example, recommend that 
the customer transfer his or her money to a different bank that pays a 
greater interest rate or refinance his or her mortgage with another 
lender offering better terms. So even if there is a strong customer 
demand for greater data sharing, banks will still have incentives to 
limit or prohibit it. 
The current financial regulatory environment has not resolved 
this market failure. Financial regulators have, for the most part, taken 
a top-down approach to banking oversight, focusing more on stabilizing 
the financial system rather than spurring innovation and efficiency.87 
Proposals to break up big banks similarly fail to address the main 
causes of the market failure in the financial system: asymmetric 
information and switching costs.88  
In order to resolve these problems, we need to develop a financial 
regulatory structure that focuses on data. But this structure must not 
simply increase rights to data privacy. Privacy is certainly an element 
of data rights, but it is not the only value. Just as important is the right 
of individuals to share, use, and access their data. Data autonomy, thus, 
embraces not just data privacy, but also data sharing, and includes a 
much more comprehensive array of rights and obligations.   
While introducing a concept of data autonomy into financial 
regulation would require substantial changes to current law, it is not 
entirely without precedent. Around the globe, countries are 
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experimenting with new financial regulatory structures to address the 
lack of data sharing in financial services.89 These regulations, often 
referred to as “open banking” rules, enable consumers to give third-
party providers access to their financial data and accounts in a secure, 
easy, transparent, and inexpensive way. Under these structures, 
fintech companies can use application programming interfaces (“APIs”) 
to automatically access a consumer’s bank account, analyze financial 
transactions, move money around, pay bills, and make investments. 
Consumers could, for example, completely outsource their personal 
financial management to certified third-party providers that analyze 
their spending and income flows, shop for the best credit card and loan 
rates for them, and even automatically switch them to better services. 
Open banking rules aim to open up data in the financial sector in order 
to lower asymmetric information and search and switch costs that 
inhibit competition. Thus, while data autonomy would mark a dramatic 
shift in the legal rules governing data, it is not implausible or even 
unprecedented. We now turn to the question of just precisely what it 
would require. 
II. DATA AUTONOMY 
We have argued that the financial system suffers from a lack of 
competition. This lack of competition is caused by a combination of 
market frictions and legal uncertainty. As a result, consumers have 
failed to benefit from many of the innovations that have been made 
possible in recent years by advancements in big data, artificial 
intelligence, and fintech more generally. Thus, we have argued, 
financial regulation must be recast in a comprehensive manner in order 
to facilitate the kinds of technological innovation that have largely been 
missing from the financial world.   
Now we will turn to the question of reform. This Part lays out 
what data autonomy might look like in financial regulation and what 
new legal rules will be necessary in order to implement it. In particular, 
this Part argues that data-focused financial regulation must be guided 
by four key principles. First, it must establish that consumers own their 
financial data. Second, it must require financial institutions to grant 
access to that data to the persons and firms that consumers so choose. 
Third, it must set forth rules on the structure and terms of that access, 
with a focus on creating interoperable standards. And fourth, it must 
create strong incentives for firms throughout their financial ecosystem 
 
 89. See discussion infra Section II.E (taking “lessons from abroad” about implementing 
regulatory structures that account for data sharing in the financial sector). 
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to establish and maintain proper cybersecurity procedures. This Part 
also surveys how other jurisdictions have addressed these problems and 
draws lessons from their experiences. 
A. Ownership 
The first prong of data autonomy in financial regulation must 
focus on the ownership of financial data. In particular, it must 
establish, in clear and incontrovertible terms, that consumers own their 
financial data.90 Property rights in data would bring with them all the 
separate benefits that property law entails: the right to use, destroy, 
exclude, and transfer.91 Consumers would, as a result, have not just the 
ability, but the right to see, compile, aggregate, delete, and sell their 
financial data as they see fit, and without the permission of the 
financial institutions with which they transact.   
Data ownership would seem to be a simple proposition, but it is 
not as incontrovertible as it might appear at first glance.92 When asked 
 
 90. The importance of clarity here is hard to overstate. As will be discussed further below, 
property rights in the digital era have been deeply controversial and, to date, are still largely in 
flux. And without clear data ownership rules, participants have little certainty about the terms 
under which they are interacting with others. As property scholars have long recognized, this is 
problematic from many perspectives. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring 
Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1022 (2008) (“There cannot be ownership 
in land without some clear idea of who owns the land, what land is owned, and what rights accrue 
to the owner as a result of her status.”); Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and 
Freedom: On Taking Our Own Advice, 59 SMU L. REV. 345, 352 (2006) (“Individuals working to 
grow their assets must be supported by clear laws defining their property rights.”); Henry E. 
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1797 (2004) (“Property rules have 
informational advantages.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in 
Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (arguing that the fact that property “is 
required to come in standardized packages that the layperson can understand at low 
cost . . . constitutes a deep design principle of the law”). 
 91. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1369, 1390–1420 (2013) (exploring the features and functions of these core rights under  
property law). 
 92. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for 
Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220 (2018) (surveying international approaches to data 
ownership); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 784 (2007) (“[T]he classic justification for legal entitlements 
protected by a property rule depends on the ability to define and enforce property rights 
effectively.”); Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal 
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 392–93 (2003) (arguing that state and federal law “fail to 
provide coherent and systematic protection of personal information” on the internet); Stacy-Ann 
Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 432 
n.36 (2018) (highlighting “the inadequacies of existing privacy frameworks in remedying consumer 
harms that may occur as a result of data disclosures”); Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and 
the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (2011) (“It is unclear what legal right or interest, 
if any, consumers have in their personal information.”); Andreas Boerding, Nicolai Culik, 
Christian Doepke, Thomas Hoeren, Tim Juelicher, Charlotte Roettgen & Max V. Schoenfeld, Data 
Ownership: A Property Rights Approach from a European Perspective, 11 J. CIV. L. STUD. 323, 325 
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whether a consumer owns the information in their bank account, one 
consumer rights advocate admitted, “You don’t. You totally don’t.”93 The 
Financial Data and Technology Association, an industry consortium, 
has similarly argued that “the right for the consumer to control their 
data . . . is murky.”94 Large financial institutions, while addressing the 
terms of data exchange, have avoided taking public stands on the issue.  
This position of ambiguity is in stark contrast to many other 
technology sectors. For example, Mark Zuckerberg has stated in 
testimony before the Senate that “people own all of their own content” 
on Facebook.95 Google’s terms of service for its cloud storage accounts 
explicitly state that “[w]e do not claim ownership in any of your 
content.”96 Both of these companies have established rights for users to 
delete and transfer their data if they so choose.   
The lack of clarity on the legal structure of financial data 
ownership has led to complaints about potentially harmful effects in the 
financial industry. In 2016, the director of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), Richard Cordray, stated that “we are 
gravely concerned by reports that some financial institutions are 
looking for ways to limit, or even shut off, access to financial data.”97 In 
2019, Senator John Kennedy introduced a bill, entitled the “Own Your 
Own Data Act of 2019,” which, if enacted, would provide that “[e]ach 
individual owns and has an exclusive property right in the data that an 
individual generates on the internet.”98   
While the basic principle⎯that consumers own their financial 
data⎯is straightforward, how exactly that principle might apply to the 
financial sector, and in particular how it might be limited, raises 
difficult legal and policy issues. The initial problem, of course, is 
 
(2018) (arguing that European property law provides “sufficient common principles to establish a 
comprehensive concept of data ownership”). 
 93. See Colin Wilhelm, Is Your Bank Data Yours?, POLITICO (Oct. 11, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/10/11/who-owns-financial-data-000538 
[https://perma.cc/7J5J-5XBR]. 
 94. See Letter from Steven Boms, Exec. Dir., Fin. Data & Tech. Ass’n, to House Task  
Force on Fin. Tech. (June 20, 2019), https://fdata.global/north-america/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/ 
2019/06/FDATA-FinTech-Task-Force-Letter-for-Record-6.25.19-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/557X-
X3CG]. 
 95. See Transcript of Zuckerberg’s Appearance Before House Committee, WASH. POST (Apr. 
11, 2018, 8:53 PM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/11/ 
transcript-of-zuckerbergs-appearance-before-house-committee/ [https://perma.cc/KF77-YRG8]. 
 96. See Google Drive Terms of Service, GOOGLE DRIVE HELP, https://support.google.com/drive/ 
answer/2450387?hl=en (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JB4R-BYFB]. 
 97. See Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks at Money 
20/20 (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-
cfpb-director-richard-cordray-money-2020/ [https://perma.cc/E6CT-NGTD].  
 98. See Own Your Own Data Act, S. 806, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019).  
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defining just what counts as consumer financial data.99 Banks, credit 
card companies, lenders, and others possess tremendous amounts of 
information about their customers and users, and establishing the 
boundaries of which parts of that information belong to the financial 
institution and which parts belong to consumers is inevitably 
complicated.100 Take, for example, a typical savings account at a bank. 
On one side of the spectrum, we have the consumer’s personal 
information, such as name, social security number, driver’s license 
number, etc. This would appear quite clearly to be the consumer’s data 
and thus owned by the consumer, not the bank. On the other side of the 
spectrum is information that can be seen by the consumer but that is 
not directly related to them, such as the variety of accounts that the 
bank offers or their branch locations. This type of data would clearly be 
bank-owned data, not consumer-owned data.  
But in between these clear cases lie a number of trickier 
scenarios. Is the interest rate offered by the bank the bank’s data or the 
consumer’s? If the bank provides budgeting tools or enhanced 
information about payments that would be unavailable to the consumer 
operating on their own, is the data produced by those tools the bank’s 
or the consumer’s? Much of this information is considered by financial 
institutions as confidential, meaning that its release to other parties 
might harm the institution itself. And yet, this information is vital to 
ensuring that consumers understand their financial lives. Credit events 
are an even starker example of the complexity of drawing ownership 
lines when it comes to financial data: when borrowers miss a payment, 
or outright default, does this information belong to the borrower or to 
the bank? If it belongs to the borrowers, they might have the right to 
ask the bank to erase the negative events and thus compromise the 
ability of banks to discern between good and bad borrowers. 
Fortunately, the concept of data ownership has received 
significant attention from scholars and policymakers, and models for 
sorting through these problems exist. For example, under the 
administration of President Barack Obama, the Office of Management 
and Budget issued guidance on the protection of individual data within 
government offices.101 This guidance sets forth the scope of what 
 
 99. See William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1148–52, 
1164–68 (2019); Joseph V. DeMarco & Brian A. Fox, Data Rights and Data Wrongs: Civil Litigation 
and the New Privacy Norms, 128 YALE L.J. 1016, 1024–26 (2019). 
 100. See Stacy Cowley, Banks and Retailers Are Tracking How You Type, Swipe and Tap, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/business/behavioral-biometrics-
banks-security.html [https://perma.cc/X8LH-A7N7]; Andriotis & Glazer, supra note 22 (describing 
negotiations between Facebook and financial firms over access to customers’ financial data). 
 101. See OFF. OF MGMT & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, M-10-23, GUIDANCE FOR 
AGENCY USE OF THIRD-PARTY WEBSITES AND APPLICATIONS (2010).  
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personal data is, what the requirements are for accessing and using it, 
and the duties that government officials have with respect to it. In the 
health sector, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”) establishes ground rules on how healthcare companies 
handle personally identifiable information.102 The European Union’s 
much-debated General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) also 
includes extensive sections defining the boundaries of personal data 
and the rights of consumers over it.103 All of these are potential models 
for defining consumer-owned financial data. Given the increasing value 
of data to consumer choice and market efficiency, we are inclined to 
adopt a more expansive definition of consumer data in order to ensure 
that consumers have control over their information. But regardless of 
the precise definition adopted, the very process of identifying the data 
that is owned by financial institutions and the data that is owned by 
consumers will itself produce important benefits. Greater clarity about 
the legal status of personal financial data is essential to improving 
competition within the sector.104  
B. Access  
But data ownership alone is not enough to ensure that 
consumers can use their financial data in the ways that they desire. 
Regulators must also focus on requiring banks and other financial 
institutions to grant access to this financial data, both to consumers and 
their desired delegates, in convenient and reasonably cost-effective 
ways. After all, if consumers own their financial data, but financial 
institutions limit the ways in which they may use it, then data 
ownership alone will be insufficient to ensure a competitive landscape. 
Data access rights, thus, are integral to establishing data autonomy in 
financial regulation.105 
Again, it would appear largely unobjectionable that consumers 
should have rights to access their financial data and to show this 
 
 102. See Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting Health Privacy in an Era of Big 
Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 597 (2014); Sharona Hoffman 
& Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic 
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 336 (2007). 
 103. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard, 
71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 375–80 (2019); W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A. Houser, Personal Data and 
the GDPR: Providing a Competitive Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 287, 314–15, 
328 (2019). 
 104. On the importance of clear property rules to efficiency, see supra note 90. 
 105. Here, for example, is how one consumer rights group describes the problem: 
Over the last several years, some U.S. financial institutions have sought to institute a 
range of technical and administrative hurdles that would interfere with consumers’ 
ability to use third-party tools. These financial institutions have moved to limit the 
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financial data to whomsoever they choose. Indeed, of all the planks of 
data autonomy in financial regulation, access to data has the clearest 
legal grounding. Dodd-Frank section 1033, after all, requires financial 
institutions to make information available to consumers concerning 
their financial services, including “information relating to any 
transaction, series of transactions, or to the account including costs, 
charges and usage data.”106 The CFPB has bolstered this requirement 
by issuing a set of principles on data sharing practices, and these 
principles include specific sections devoted to access. They include, for 
example, provisions related to data scope, usability, and control, and 
they provide in-depth descriptions of the kinds of data that financial 
institutions should share with consumers and third-party fintech 
companies.107 Thus, the right to access and share financial data stands 
on firm legal ground. 
But despite the current regulatory framework, in recent years 
financial institutions have raised a number of technological and legal 
barriers to this access.108 They have restricted access to account 
 
amount of data that consumers can share, or are seeking to define bilateral agreements 
with onerous contractual terms that would restrict consumers’ ability to take full 
advantage of marketplace solutions that would empower them to improve their 
financial state. As a result, there are an escalating number of cases where consumers 
are excluded from engaging with fintech services best suited to improve their financial 
well-being. 
Examining Opportunities and Challenges in the Financial Technology (“Fintech”) Marketplace: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
115th Cong. 130–32 (2018) (Letter from the Consumer Financial Data Rights Group to the H. Fin. 
Servs. Comm.). 
 106. Section 1033 provides: 
Subject to rules prescribed by the Bureau, a covered person shall make available to a 
consumer, upon request, information in the control or possession of the covered person 
concerning the consumer financial product or service that the consumer obtained from 
such covered person, including information relating to any transaction, series of 
transactions, or to the account including costs, charges and usage data. The information 
shall be made available in an electronic form usable by consumers. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1033(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5533(a). 
 107. See Consumer Protection Principles: Consumer-Authorized Financial Data Sharing and 
Aggregation, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 3 (Oct. 18, 2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/ 
f/documents/cfpb_consumer-protection-principles_data-aggregation.pdf [https://perma.cc/G78Z-
2H96]:  
Financial data subject to consumer and consumer-authorized access may include any 
transaction, series of transactions, or other aspect of consumer usage; the terms of any 
account, such as a fee schedule; realized consumer costs, such as fees or interest paid; 
and realized consumer benefits, such as interest earned or rewards. 
 108. See AM. BANKER, supra note 23 (describing how financial firms have resorted to using 
platforms that “restrict[ ] how much and how often apps can tap information, while also setting 
contractual limits on what they can do with it later”). 
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information,109 they have blocked traffic from some fintech servers,110 
and they have prevented customers from viewing their data through 
fintech portals.111 Increasingly, financial institutions have refused to 
grant access to consumer-oriented fintech startups until those startups 
agree to burdensome data sharing agreements.112 Financial institutions 
have listed a number of reasons for these obstacles, including ensuring 
the security of customer data released to third parties, clarifying where 
liability lies in the transaction, and protecting their own systems from 
cybertheft.113 But regardless of the cause, these obstacles have made it 
difficult, and costly, for consumers to access and share their data in 
convenient ways. Adding to the dilemma, the CFPB has been 
significantly more active in ensuring data privacy than in ensuring  
data sharing.114 
Thus, in order to ensure that financial markets are efficient and 
transparent, financial regulators must go further in creating, 
explaining, and enforcing data sharing rights. For one, they must set 
forth, in unambiguous language, the terms and conditions on which 
financial access occurs. Perhaps just as importantly, they must make 
clear that failures to grant access on such terms will be sanctioned. As 
the post-Dodd-Frank era has shown, financial institutions have many 
ways to restrict or limit otherwise clear statutory obligations.115 Until 
there are strong incentives for them to grant consumers and fintech 
startups greater access to their data, it is likely that they will refrain 
 
 109. See Jennifer Surane, Capital One Restricts Third-Party Data Access, Upsets Customers, 
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2018, 6:00 AM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-
27/capital-one-restricts-third-party-data-access-upsets-customers [https://perma.cc/T7P5-SGYR]. 
 110. Cf. Penny Crosman, The Truth Behind the Hubbub over Screen Scraping, AM. BANKER 
(Nov. 12, 2015, 2:15 PM EST), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-truth-behind-the-
hubbub-over-screen-scraping [https://perma.cc/MF4U-62PM] (describing potential reasons why 
banks are justified in blocking fintech companies from accessing their servers). 
 111. See Robin Sidel, Big Banks Lock Horns with Personal-Finance Web Portals, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 4, 2015, 7:30 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-lock-horns-with-personal-
finance-web-portals-1446683450 [https://perma.cc/4CVW-AKR8] (describing how banks have 
become more protective of their customers’ personal information). 
 112. See Penny Crosman, U.S. Bank Embraces Open Banking with Data-Sharing Agreements, 
AM. BANKER (Sept. 24, 2019, 10:24 AM EDT), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/us-bank-
embraces-open-banking-with-data-sharing-agreements [https://perma.cc/W9PG-TMKS]. 
 113. See id.; Crosman, supra note 110; AM. BANKER, supra note 23. 
 114. See Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation by Default: Platforms, Privacy, and the CFPB, 
2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 531, 536–38 (2018). 
 115. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A 
Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in 
International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (2011) (“Financial institutions 
and other businesses seeking lower levels of regulation can now move from nation to nation 
seeking weaker regulatory standards, producing a race-to-the-bottom in international financial 
regulation.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to 
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 932 (2012). 
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from making the costly and time-consuming changes that will be 
necessary to facilitate efficient and competitive data sharing.116 
One of the key problems in financial data sharing is that there 
are few compelling business reasons for banks to engage in it.117 In the 
financial industry, banks tend to be net producers, not consumers, of 
data.118 In other words, banks possess tremendous amounts of financial 
data, and they have limited need to gain access to the data of others. As 
a result, the concept of data sharing is often viewed within large banks 
as a cost-creating department, not a revenue-creating one.119 To be sure, 
if banks fail to provide fintech firms with access to their platforms, 
while their competitors do, they may lose customers in the long-term.120 
But consumers are often held up by banks because of asymmetric 
information and search and switch costs, and the executive 
decisionmakers at banks, focused on immediate returns and with 
limited time horizons, may well discount the value of these long- 
term benefits.121   
Furthermore, data sharing appears to cut against the trend in 
the industry towards data privacy. In recent years, regulators have 
increasingly pushed financial institutions to strengthen their 
authentication procedures and cybersecurity processes in order to 
ensure that hackers do not gain unauthorized access to customer 
 
 116. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1253 
(1999) (“Insofar as corporate law is regulatory, it provides incentives and disincentives to the major 
actors in the corporate enterprise—directors, officers, and significant shareholders—through the 
threat of liability.”). 
 117. See discussion supra Section I.C (describing the financial sector’s reluctance to hand over 
data to fintech firms). 
 118. See Maria Aspan, Why Banks Still Struggle with Big Data, AM. BANKER (May 21, 2014, 
12:52 PM EDT), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-banks-still-struggle-with-big-data 
[https://perma.cc/H4CR-AEJ9] (describing why banks have been less successful with deploying the 
massive amounts of customer information they collect). 
 119. For a discussion of the perception of transaction costs and value creators in the corporate 
environment, and the extensive role that business lawyers can have in this paradigm, see Ronald 
J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J.  
239 (1984). 
 120. See, e.g., Lauren Brodsky & Liz Oakes, Data Sharing and Open Banking, MCKINSEY & 
CO. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/data-
sharing-and-open-banking [https://perma.cc/M9M2-VN3W] (discussing the competitive 
opportunities that open banking and data access provide to banks). 
 121. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 
249 (2010): 
It is now well-recognized that by enabling executives to cash large amounts of equity-
based and bonus compensation before the long-term consequences of decisions are 
realized, pay arrangements have provided executives with incentives to focus 
excessively on short-term results and give insufficient weight to the consequences that 
risk-taking would have for long-term shareholder value. 
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data.122 Banks have responded by making it more difficult and 
cumbersome for customers to access their financial accounts.123 But 
while this shift may have improved data security, it has also set up new 
obstacles for data sharing. If, for example, a bank only allows customers 
access through two-factor authentication models, some fintech startups 
may be excluded from access. The tension between data sharing and 
data privacy could not be starker.124 
Given these dynamics, regulatory pressure to improve and 
increase data sharing within the financial industry is both desirable 
and necessary. Without it, it is likely that efforts to create open, 
transparent financial markets will be slow and halting. The right to 
access, and share, financial data must, at a minimum, include 
affirmative rights by consumers and fintech companies to see and use 
their financial data in convenient forms and on reasonable terms, 
backed up by monetary penalties if this access is obstructed or delayed.     
C. Interoperability 
Data-oriented financial regulation must also focus on creating 
interoperable standards for data sharing. Just as it is important to 
create clear ownership rights over data, and clear access rights, it is 
also important to ensure that this data is stored and managed in 
standardized ways. Interoperability is integral to the proper 
functioning of a market in data, and without it, transaction costs and 
market leverage may threaten to impede competition within the sector.   
While ownership and access rights are justified primarily based 
on the reluctance of financial institutions to recognize or grant such 
rights on their own, interoperability rules are justified by simpler 
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 124. See INFO. SEC. MEDIA GRP., THE FUTURE OF ADAPTIVE AUTHENTICATION IN THE 
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY (2019), https://www.onespan.com/sites/default/files/2019-03/OneSpan-
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perma.cc/8VPR-NHPA] (arguing that banks do not need to choose between providing a secure 
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coordination-based reasons. Despite the fact that scholars and 
policymakers focus much of their attention on large Wall Street banks 
of the “too big to fail” type, the banking landscape in the United States 
is in fact quite fragmented. There are over five thousand FDIC-insured 
banks in the United States.125 There are another 5,733 NCUA-insured 
credit unions.126 And this does not even count other financial firms, such 
as insurance companies, online lenders, and payment companies. Thus, 
despite the widespread perception that the financial industry is highly 
concentrated, in fact there exists a large number of relevant actors. 
The fragmentation of financial markets increases the difficulty 
of accessing and analyzing data, and thus, increases the barriers to 
entry for fintech companies. The cost for a small fintech startup to gain 
access to this system—where there are thousands of different banks 
that must be taken into account, each with its own website, 
authentication procedures, and account design—is high.127 One of the 
costs, of course, is simply software: it is hard to design a system for 
accessing many different types of websites and to maintain that system 
as myriad banks review, update, and change security procedures. This 
is more than just a theoretical problem. In 2015, J.P. Morgan and Wells 
Fargo changed technical features of their websites in a way that left 
Mint customers unable to see their account information through Mint’s 
app for several days.128 In 2018, Capital One changed its cybersecurity 
procedures for its website in a way that limited one of the biggest data 
aggregators, Plaid, from accessing account information.129 As a result, 
customers of Venmo, Robinhood, and Acorns all lost the ability  
to use those companies’ apps.130 Fintech startups that seek to  
provide seamless service to customers must, as a result, spend 
tremendous resources and manpower just ensuring that their software  
continues working.   
Another expense that stems from fragmentation in the market 
is negotiation cost.131 Many banks now require fintech companies that 
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 126. Baker Shogry, How Many Financial Institutions Are in the U.S.?, PLAID (July 19, 2017), 
https://blog.plaid.com/how-many-fis/ [https://perma.cc/V43U-28ZY]. 
 127. See Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive, supra note 15, at 242–44 (discussing 
the significant barriers to entry that fintech firms face in the financial industry).  
 128. Sidel, supra note 111. 
 129. Surane, supra note 109. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH AND INNOVATION 29 (2018) (“Consumers’ ability 
to realize the benefits of data aggregation is limited, in part due to the lack of agreement between 
data aggregators and financial services companies over access to consumer financial account and 
transaction data.”). 
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seek to access their financial data to first sign burdensome data sharing 
agreements that set forth the terms on which that access occurs.132 
While these agreements have a clear rationale from the perspective of 
banks, which seek to limit their exposure to liability from data sharing 
as well as conduct due diligence on the identity of the fintech company 
accessing their website, they also impose outsized costs on fintech 
companies seeking to provide comprehensive services to customers.133 
After all, negotiating a single contract with a bank can be costly, but at 
least it has a limited time horizon and fixed costs. Negotiating 
thousands of such contracts, on the other hand, is beyond the reach of 
all but the largest fintech companies.134 Without some sort of 
standardized set of terms and conditions of access, the cost of doing 
business for most fintech institutions will simply be prohibitive. 
Just as importantly, there are strong reasons for financial 
institutions not to adopt interoperable standards.135 As mentioned 
before, banks and other financial firms view data sharing as, at best, a 
compliance cost and, at worst, a competitive threat. Thus, to the extent 
that banks can achieve substantive compliance with the law, but at the 
same time erect barriers to growth in the market, they may view such 
scenarios as desirable business strategies. The current structure of 
varied and inconsistent access protocols and application program 
interfaces, which raises costs for fintech companies, thus serves their 
interests. As a result, they will have little interest in converging 
towards an industry-wide, interoperable standard, which would lower 
barriers to entry. Even in the best of cases, where market participants 
have a strong interest in consistent standards and interoperable 
software, coordination can be difficult. Where they have active interests 
in divergence, coordination becomes nearly impossible. 
To be sure, some firms are seeking to overcome these difficulties. 
One major feature of the data economy today is the growth of data 
aggregators, who specialize in gathering business data from a wide 
variety of sources and then packaging and reselling it in more user-
friendly formats.136 Data aggregators have played an essential role in 
 
 132. See, e.g., Crosman, supra note 110 (describing why banks and aggregators make these 
agreements that, for example, only allow the aggregators access to bank systems at certain times); 
Crosman, supra note 78 (describing Wells Fargo’s data sharing agreement with Plaid).  
 133. See Crosman, supra note 110; Crosman, supra note 78. 
 134. See Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, supra note 20 (“The typical fintech firm is small, 
leanly staffed, and narrowly focused on one type of service.”). 
 135. See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013) (exploring 
the problem of parallel exclusion in which multiple firms engage in conduct that blocks or slows 
would-be market entrants). 
 136. See Brian Hurh, Adam D. Maarec & Chris Chamness, Consumer Financial Data 
Aggregation and the Potential for Regulatory Intervention, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 20, 21 
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enabling fintech startups to gain greater insight into consumer 
financial data.137 Plaid and Finicity, for example, have negotiated 
agreements with many of the largest banks for access to their 
systems.138 They have been able to take advantage of their larger size 
and position as more established market players to gain leverage with 
large financial institutions.139 Other fintech companies, in turn, can 
work with the data aggregators to gain access to the financial data they 
need. Plaid counts among its customers Venmo, Betterment, Acorns, 
and Coinbase.140 
But data aggregators cannot resolve the basic problem of 
fragmentation: until banks have interoperable standards for data 
sharing, fintech companies will either have to face the daunting 
challenge of finding ways to access thousands of banks’ platforms or, 
alternatively, pay third-party middlemen to do it for them. Both of these 
options are expensive and burdensome. Neither of them facilitates the 
kind of open, transparent data sharing market that is necessary to 
increase competition and innovation in the sector. 
Thus, in order for a transparent, data-focused financial market 
to develop, regulation will need to force convergence and 
interoperability on the industry. The basic principle here is simple. 
Regulation should encourage financial institutions to develop 
interoperable platforms that allow consumers and fintech companies 
 
(2017) (“For roughly two decades, ‘data aggregators’ have sought to collect consumers’ financial 
account information from various financial institutions, including transaction, balance, and fee 
information relating to credit cards, auto loans, mortgages, and securities.”). 
 137. See Odinet, supra note 63, at 802 (discussing how online banking, accounting, and other 
software create information bundles that help fintech platforms operate efficiently). 
 138. See Telis Demos, Fintech Firm Plaid Raises $44 Million, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2016,  
7:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fintech-firm-plaid-raises-44-million-1466377808 [https:// 
perma.cc/QYU4-77WL] (discussing how Plaid’s software “allows a variety of financial-technology 
startups to access their customers’ bank account information”); John Detrixhe, The Seeds of  
Visa’s $5.3 Billion Acquisition of Plaid Were Planted More Than a Year Ago, QUARTZ (Jan. 6,  
2020), https://qz.com/1784765/the-seeds-of-visas-5-3-billion-acquisition-of-plaid-were-planted-
more-than-a-year-ago/ [https://perma.cc/BLL2-82EP] (mentioning Plaid’s agreements with 
JPMorgan, Wells Fargo, and PNC); Working Together to Strengthen Data Sharing, FINICITY (Aug. 
7, 2020), https://www.finicity.com/td-bank-data-sharing-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/U5UU-
LS5D] (mentioning Finicity’s agreements with Chase, Wells Fargo, Capital One, USAA, Fidelity, 
and US Bank); Penny Crosman, The Battle over Bank Customer Data May Finally Be Over, AM. 
BANKER (Nov. 6, 2017, 12:17 PM EST), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-battle-over-
bank-customer-data-may-finally-be-over [https://perma.cc/44KQ-UCFL] (discussing the increase 
in use of fintech platforms by large banks, such as Wells Fargo’s use of Finicity). 
 139. See Wells Fargo and Plaid Sign Data Exchange Agreement, WELLS FARGO (Sept. 19, 
2019), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/innovation-and-technology/wells-fargo-and-plaid-
sign-data-exchange-agreement [https://perma.cc/6PZ9-CTHS] (“We want to be where our 
customers are . . . [a]nd if customers want to share their Wells Fargo account information with a 
Plaid-supported app to help them better manage their finances, we want to enable them to do  
so seamlessly . . . .”). 
 140. PLAID, https://plaid.com (last visited Dec. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9NTJ-B2Z9]. 
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access to their financial data in standardized formats and processes.141 
If banks change or upgrade their security procedures, they should be 
obligated to ensure that these changes do not obstruct data access.142 
The terms of access (such as liability allocation, data security 
requirements, and consumer consent) should be reasonably uniform 
across the industry.143   
The devil, of course, is in the details, and precisely what 
standards, what platforms, and what terms should be established will 
be matters of intense debate. Fintech firms tend to favor open-ended 
access that mirrors the data that consumers can see.144 Large 
incumbent banks tend to favor more limited access that has clear 
liability and tracing requirements.145 Industry groups are starting to 
work on some of these problems, attempting to reach consensus on the 
terms of data sharing and access. The Financial Data Exchange, for 
example, is a consortium of financial services and technology 
companies⎯including large institutions like Bank of America, Capital 
One, Citi, and Wells Fargo⎯that seeks to create and disseminate data 
sharing standards.146 But progress within these groups has been slow—
perhaps because of the lack of incentives for interoperability among the 
 
 141. For a general discussion of interoperability and market access, see Alan Devlin, Michael 
Jacobs & Bruno Peixoto, Success, Dominance, and Interoperability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157 (2009); 
Suzanne Van Arsdale & Cody Venzke, Predatory Innovation in Software Markets, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 243 (2015); Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy, 
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1549 (2009); Stacy A. Baird, Government Role and the Interoperability 
Ecosystem, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 219 (2009). But see Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, 
Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy 
Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335 (2013) (arguing that while “data portability is appealing,” a new law 
requiring it as a right presents concerns for competition laws, privacy, and data protection). 
 142. See Crosman, supra note 138 (noting that consumers need a secure and transparent way 
to control access to their data as they please). 
 143. See Brad Carr, Pablo Urbiola & Adrien Delle-Case, Liability and Consumer Protection in 
Open Banking, INST. INT’L FIN. 6 (2018), https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/private/32370132_ 
liability_and_consumer_protection_in_open_banking_091818.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DJQ-QMJ6] 
(recommending a formal consumer protection framework for open banking systems addressing 
security, customer problems, and liability). 
 144. See Daniel Döderlein, Fintechs’ Defense of Screen Scraping Is Shortsighted, AM. BANKER 
(Sept. 7, 2017, 11:48 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/fintechs-defense-of-screen-
scraping-is-shortsighted [https://perma.cc/R2HH-YBAU] (noting that fintech firms prefer screen 
scraping because it provides access to the same information that consumers have, whereas banks’ 
APIs provide only limited information). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See FIN. DATA EXCH., https://financialdataexchange.org/FDX/About/FDX/About/About.as
px (last visited Dec. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9VJA-9PEF] (“The Financial Data Exchange (FDX) 
is a nonprofit organization that is dedicated to unifying the financial industry around a common, 
interoperable and royalty-free standard for the secure access of user permissioned financial 
data.”); Members, FIN. DATA EXCH., https://financialdataexchange.org/FDX/The%20Consortium/ 
FDX/The-Consortium/Members.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3CCL-N4KD] 
(listing Bank of America, Capital One, Citi, and Wells Fargo as members). 
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largest players.147 Regulation could speed up the development and 
adoption of the kinds of standards that the industry needs.148 
Ultimately, however, precisely what standard becomes the 
industry rule is less important than the fact that there is a standard in 
the first place.149 As mentioned before, fragmentation in the market 
creates a high barrier to entry for fintech firms seeking to provide 
services to consumers. The lack of uniformity in data access and sharing 
standards has meant that fintech firms must spend extensive time and 
resources on ensuring their programs work across the wide variety of 
banks and financial institutions from which they draw data. The 
creation of a uniform interface or software standard could 
simultaneously reduce transaction costs and provide financial 
institutions with greater certainty about the liability risks and contract 
terms of data sharing. 
D. Security 
Finally, data-oriented financial regulation must also ensure that 
financial data sharing occurs in a secure and protected fashion. Just as 
it is important to ensure that consumers own their financial data and 
can access and share it in reasonably convenient formats, it is also 
important to establish legal frameworks governing the respective 
obligations of parties that possess or receive that data. As the financial 
industry becomes more open and transparent to third-party fintech 
companies that filter, aggregate, and analyze individual data, it is 
essential that these changes do not undermine the systems in place to 
protect financial data from hacking or unauthorized disclosure.     
Of course, simply saying that financial institutions must protect 
data from cybertheft does not ensure that they will, or even that they 
can. Recent years have witnessed an explosion of large-scale and 
damaging data breaches that exposed the personal information of 
billions of people.150 These hacks have affected some of the largest 
 
 147. See Ron Shevlin, Why Open Banking Won’t Work in the US, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2019, 5:00 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronshevlin/2019/04/15/open-banking-wont-work-in-us/ [https:// 
perma.cc/P8MK-US67] (noting that previous attempts by big banks to integrate fintech took many 
years and required outside assistance). 
 148. Similar regulations have been proposed in the healthcare industry. See HHS Proposes 
New Rules to Improve the Interoperability of Electronic Health Information, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/02/11/hhs-proposes-new-
rules-improve-interoperability-electronic-health-information.html [https://perma.cc/MZC7-RTJ5]. 
 149. See William Magnuson, The Race to the Middle, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2020) 
(discussing how a standard regulation produces interoperability effects, allowing systems to 
“interact seamlessly” due to lack of conflicting processes). 
 150. A study by the Identity Theft Resource Center identified 1,244 data breaches in 2018. 
These breaches led to the exposure of 446 million records. The financial sector alone accounted for 
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companies in the world.151 Some researchers have found troubling flaws 
in the cybersecurity procedures of fintech companies.152 And precisely 
how law can effect change in cybersecurity, if it can at all, is a matter 
of substantial uncertainty.153 Two basic principles of cybersecurity law 
can, however, provide incentives for companies to adopt best practices 
in data protection, even if they cannot provide perfect compliance. 
One important feature of data sharing is traceability. The idea 
behind traceability is to ensure that data is tracked as it moves from 
one party to another.154 Traceability is essential in securing data and 
preventing data from being used for unauthorized purposes.155 It also 
allows consumers to see where their data is going and how it is being 
used.156 Existing technologies provide support for at least some measure 
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of traceability in financial data.157 Companies can, for example, include 
user consent information in the metadata that is associated with 
transaction data.158 This allows governments and market participants 
to observe an audit trail and confirm that regulatory requirements are 
being met.159   
Another important prong of cybersecurity within the data 
sharing industry is liability. The stakes here are large. One study found 
that the average cost of a data breach in the financial industry was 
approximately $5.9 million.160 The cost per record lost was $210.161 
Among participants in the study, the probability of a data breach in the 
next two years was estimated at 29.6 percent.162 In other words, the 
likelihood of a data breach is high, and the damage from that breach is 
large. As a result, determining who is liable for data breaches and theft 
is essential. Currently, however, this determination is ambiguous—
there is no overarching rule on when data sharing participants are 
liable for data breaches or how responsibility is partitioned.163 Instead, 
market participants must reach agreement on how liability works 
through private negotiation. This in turn introduces new pathologies, 
as larger market players with greater leverage can impose burdensome 
rules on smaller players, with the threat of market exclusion backing 
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 161. Id. at 27. 
 162. Id. at 10. 
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their demands. And consumers seeking to be made whole for their 
losses face the prospect of expensive and time-consuming litigation.164 
Instead, data-oriented financial regulation must provide clear 
rules about who is liable in the event of a data breach or theft. Several 
possible structures for determining liability exist, not all of them 
mutually exclusive.165 First, one could establish a rule that the breached 
party is responsible for any losses that result from the breach. Such a 
rule would have the advantage of increasing incentives for financial 
institutions to maintain effective cybersecurity procedures, but perhaps 
the disadvantage of requiring difficult determinations of where 
breaches occurred. Alternatively, one could establish a rule that the 
primary financial institution (who will typically be the bank) must 
compensate the consumer for losses, with the provision that the 
financial institution can seek reimbursement from the breached party 
if the breached party has been negligent in protecting or storing data. 
This rule would have the advantage of providing a speedy remedy for 
consumers, but the disadvantage of placing a disproportionate burden 
on banks. Finally, one could establish an industry-wide insurance fund 
that would be used to compensate consumers for loss, with the fund 
being financed by all market participants. Again, this rule has 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it would provide 
prompt compensation to consumers and force market participants to 
bear the cost of data risks. On the other, it would involve substantial 
complexity in determining who would participate in funding the 
insurance fund and add yet another layer of government oversight.   
To be sure, data sharing liability is not unregulated under 
current law. The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Safeguards Rule 
requires financial institutions to take reasonable steps to keep 
consumer data secure.166 The SEC’s rules require investment 
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 165. For a summary of some of these structures and how they work in practice, see Carr et al., 
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 166. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
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intermediaries to protect customer records and information.167 These 
rules impose liability on financial institutions if they fail to keep 
consumer data secure. 
The problem, though, is that there is an inherent tension 
between data sharing and data liability. If a financial institution is 
responsible for any losses stemming from cyberthefts or breaches, it will 
be less likely to share data with others, who might lose it or fail to 
safeguard it. The more a financial institution opens its systems to third 
parties, the higher the chance that data breaches will occur. Thus, given 
the substantial compliance burdens on banks today, it is 
understandable that they would be hesitant to grant unfettered access 
to consumer data, even if the consumer consents to the sharing.     
But there are ways to reduce these tensions. Clear rules about 
where liability lies within data sharing transactions are a start.168 So 
are rules that exculpate financial institutions if they demonstrate that 
they have adopted reasonable cybersecurity procedures.169 The 
availability of a ready reserve of insurance funds to pay consumer 
claims could also reduce risk to financial institutions from cyber-
intrusions.170 The problem of attribution is a difficult one, but it is not 
insurmountable.171 Thus, financial regulation must aim to pair data 
sharing with enhanced data security.  
E. Lessons from Abroad  
This Part has argued that financial regulation must adjust in 
order to encourage the kinds of beneficial innovation in finance that 
technology has now made possible. It has proposed a number of 
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important regulatory changes, including establishing a right of 
ownership in financial data, a right to share that data with others, and 
an obligation on financial institutions to create interoperable and 
secure data systems. Needless to say, these proposals would require 
substantial adjustments to the regulatory framework of the financial 
industry. Fortunately for policymakers in the United States, however, 
other jurisdictions around the world have already started acting on 
precisely these questions. From Europe to Asia, countries are taking 
steps to open up their financial systems to more fulsome and 
transparent data sharing. Indeed, much of the policy experimentation 
in banking today occurs outside of the United States.172 Thus, the 
United States does not have to legislate in a vacuum. Instead, it can 
learn from the lessons of other countries that have enacted financial 
data sharing laws. This subpart will take a look at a few regulations, 
from the U.K., the E.U., and Australia, to show just how varied the 
landscape is. 
1. European Union 
Much like the United States, Europe has long had a fragmented 
financial industry.173 The E.U. has twenty-eight member states, each 
with its own financial and banking rules and regulators, making it 
difficult and costly for financial firms to operate across borders.174 
Cognizant of this problem, the E.U. has passed several directives  
aimed at creating a “single market” for financial services across  
the continent.175   
These efforts began in 2007 with a rule known as the Payment 
Service Directive.176 The Payment Service Directive aimed to 
harmonize and simplify rules governing how financial payments were 
made in the E.U.177 To do so, it created an authorization and 
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in the E.U., particularly in light of the United Kingdom’s influence on such regulation). 
 174. See Pablo Iglesias-Rodríguez, Supervisory Cooperation in the Single Market for Financial 
Services: United in Diversity?, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 589, 612 (2018) (“Nationally based 
supervisory models have lagged behind the integrated and interconnected reality of today’s 
European financial markets, in which many financial firms operate across borders.”). 
 175. Id. at 640–42. 
 176. For a history of the development of the Payment Services Directive, see Agnieszka 
Janczuk, Legislative Update, The Single Payments Area in Europe, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L.  
321 (2010). 
 177. Id. at 326–32. 
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supervisory regime for payment institutions, it set forth disclosure 
requirements for institutions offering services to consumers, and it 
established a uniform set of rights and obligations for payment 
providers and users.178   
Although the Payment Service Directive provided consumers 
with more uniform rights with regard to their payment providers and 
established more expansive disclosures to consumers about the terms 
of their accounts, it was widely seen as not going far enough.179 In 
particular, many observers noted that it failed to give fintech companies 
adequate access to the consumer data they needed.180 In response to 
these criticisms, the E.U. Council passed a Revised Directive on 
Payment Services, widely known as “PSD2,” in 2015.181 PSD2 aimed to 
go further than the initial Payment Services Directive in opening  
up banks to data sharing arrangements and competition from  
fintech firms.   
Three important features of PSD2 are relevant for our purposes. 
First, it requires payment providers to grant access to consumer 
accounts to third-party providers for account information aggregation 
services.182 Second, it requires payment providers to use “strong 
customer authentication” to ensure that any time a consumer accesses 
his account or initiates transactions, payment processors confirm that 
he consented to the transaction.183 And third, it sets forth rules aimed 
at speeding up the time in which customer complaints are resolved and 
clarifying how liability will be allocated.184   
 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Alan Brener, Payment Service Directive II and Its Implications, in DISRUPTING 
FINANCE: FINTECH AND STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 103, 106–08 (Theo Lynn, John G. Mooney, 
Pierangelo Rosati & Mark Cummins eds., 2019) (arguing that the original Payment Service 
Directive aided efficiency in a number of ways but still had significant failures). 
 180. See DATASTAX, PREPARING FOR PSD2: THE ROLE FOR DATA AND THE FUTURE FOR BANKING 
4 (2017), https://www.fintechfutures.com/files/2017/04/Whitepaper-Datastax-EMEA-PSD2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P7KR-VWN6] (arguing that old banking systems should be reengineered to 
provide more streamlined access to consumer data). 
 181. Council Directive, 2015/2366, 2015 O.J. (L 337/35). For a summary of PSD2’s key 
requirements, see Douglas W. Arner, Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Rolf H. Weber, The 
Future of Data-Driven Finance and RegTech: Lessons from EU Big Bang II, 25 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 245 (2020). 
 182. See Giuseppe Colangelo & Oscar Borgogno, Data, Innovation and Transatlantic 
Competition in Finance: The Case of the Access to Account Rule, 31 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 573 (2020) 
(describing the access-to-account rule, which requires banks and other payment providers to 
provide third-party aggregators access to consumer data on a non-discriminatory basis). 
 183. See Delayed Implementation of Strong Customer Authentication, BAKER MCKENZIE 1 
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2019/09/ 
delayed-implementation-of-strong-customer-authentication.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HHM-CYED]. 
 184. See The Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2): What You Need to Know, ERNST  
& YOUNG (2018), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/banking-and-
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In some ways, these features of PSD2 represent an aggressive 
effort to force change in the market. They require payment providers to 
provide account access to a wide range of fintech companies for two 
main purposes: to analyze the consumer’s financial data and to operate 
the account by initiating payments.185 This requirement marks a 
significant change from the status quo before the passage of the 
regulation, when few third-party fintech companies could initiate 
payments through their apps.186 PSD2 also forced banks to significantly 
bolster their customer authentication procedures. Article 97 requires 
banks to apply “strong customer authentication” any time a consumer 
accesses his payment account online, initiates a payment, or “carries 
out any action through a remote channel which may imply a risk of 
payment fraud or other abuses.”187 “Strong customer authentication,” 
in turn, is defined generally as two-factor authentication⎯that is, a 
method that requires two different types of information, such as both a 
password and access to a phone.188 Again, prior to the passage of the 
directive, many financial institutions did not use two-factor 
authentication for bank accounts. Thus, in some ways, the E.U. has 
forced significant changes on the way that financial institutions  
do business. 
At the same time, the E.U. has adopted a surprisingly 
permissive and limited regulatory stance in many other aspects of 
PSD2. For one, and perhaps most importantly, PSD2 only applies to 
payment accounts.189 This is perhaps an obvious point, given that the 
name of the directive is the Payment Services Directive, but it has 
 
capital-markets/bcm-pdf/ey-regulatory-agenda-updates.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKB9-HP8T] 
(describing PSD2’s rules governing the resolution of customer complaints).   
 185. See Council Directive, 2015/2366, supra note 181, arts. 66-67 (requiring payment 
initiation service providers to communicate with account servicing payment service providers 
immediately after transactions to share all available data). 
 186. Alessandro Longoni, PSD2 - What Changes?, FINEXTRA (May 30, 2016), 
https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/12668/psd2-what-changes [https://perma.cc/LLU8-E3F8]. 
 187. Council Directive, 2015/2366, supra note 181, art. 97(1). 
 188. Article 4(30) defines “strong customer authentication” as  
an authentication based on the use of two or more elements categorised as knowledge 
(something only the user knows), possession (something only the user possesses) and 
inherence (something the user is) that are independent, in that the breach of one does 
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Id. art. 4(30). 
 189. See, e.g., id. art. 36 (“Member States shall ensure that payment institutions have access 
to credit institutions’ payment accounts services on an objective, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate basis.”); id. art. 67(3) (“In relation to payment accounts, the account servicing 
payment service provider shall: (a) communicate securely with the account information service 
providers . . . and (b) treat data requests transmitted through the services of an account 
information service provider without any discrimination for other than objective reasons.”). 
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surprisingly profound and, in some ways, perverse effects on the 
regulation’s scope. All of PSD2’s obligations (related to consumer rights, 
access to data, and strong customer authentication) only apply to a very 
specific and limited set of accounts.190 They apply to checking accounts, 
but not savings accounts.191 They apply to current accounts, but not 
retirement accounts.192 They apply to some credit card accounts, but not 
others.193 This narrow application for data sharing has been widely 
criticized as insufficient to enable the competition and innovation that 
proponents originally hoped for.194 
PSD2 has also been criticized for failing to provide uniform 
standards for data sharing.195 While the regulation requires financial 
institutions to share consumer data with fintech companies, it does not 
specify the form in which such sharing must occur.196 As a result, 
financial institutions have devised their own proprietary platforms for 
 
 190. PSD2 applies to “payment accounts,” which it defines broadly as “account[s] held in the 
name of one or more payment service users which [are] used for the execution of payment 
transactions.” Id. art. 4(12). But courts have interpreted the term quite narrowly, such that it only 
includes accounts that can be used to pay third parties without the intervention of intermediate 
steps. See Michael McKee, James Barnard, Georgia Karamani & Marina Troullinou, ECJ Ruling 
on Interpretation of Payment Account Under PSD2, DLA PIPER (Oct. 8, 2018), https:// 
www.dlapiperintelligence.com/investmentrules/blog/articles/2018/ecj-ruling-on-interpretation-of-
payment-account-under-psd2.html [https://perma.cc/G59S-64KL] (discussing the ECJ’s finding 
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transactions without an intermediary account).  
 191. McKee et al., supra note 190.  
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and Easier for Consumers, EUR. COMM’N (Sept. 13, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_5555 [https://perma.cc/Y7Y6-GANZ] (clarifying that current 
accounts are covered by PSD2 because they are accounts “where the holder can place and withdraw 
funds” without any intervention by a payment service provider). 
 193. See Response to EBA Consultation on RTS for SCA, ASS’N OF CREDIT CARD ISSUERS 
EUR., http://www.accie.eu/pdf/ACCIE%20response%20to%20EBA%20consultation%20on%20RTS
%20SCA_October%202016.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4SHT-7DYG] (calling 
for greater clarification of which credit card accounts are covered by PSD2).  
 194. See Carlos Torres Villa, We Should Extend EU Bank Data Sharing to All Sectors,  
FIN. TIMES (June 3, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/0304b078-82c6-11e9-a7f0-77d3101896ec 
[https://perma.cc/5XD5-9HCH] (advocating for an expansion of these regulations into other sectors 
to push data-driven decisions into those sectors of the economy). 
 195. See Shahrokh Moinian, Open Banking Can Benefit from Standardized APIs, PAYTHINK: 
PAYMENTSSOURCE (Jan. 7, 2019, 12:01 AM EST), https://www.paymentssource.com/opinion/psd2-
and-open-banking-need-standards-for-apis [https://perma.cc/X665-4H9G]; Saira Guthrie, PSD2 
Deadline 14 March: Questions You Should Be Asking Yourself, PING IDENTITY (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.pingidentity.com/en/company/blog/posts/2019/psd2-deadline-march-2019-api-
interface.html [https://perma.cc/GGY2-C2GB] (“The most common critique of PSD2 is that it forces 
banks to provide open APIs, but it doesn’t specify a standard format for APIs across the EU.”). 
 196. Council Directive, 2015/2366, supra note 181, art. 67(1) (“Member States shall ensure 
that a payment service user has the right to make use of services enabling access to account 
information as referred to in point (8) of Annex I [which refers to ‘account information services’].”). 
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data sharing, without a focus on interoperability or harmonization.197 
Indeed, some software companies that develop these platforms for 
banks market their software as providing a “competitive advantage.”198 
Fintech firms have thus struggled to gain access to consumer data in 
reasonable forms and on convenient terms.199 Industry groups have 
emerged to push for more standardized data sharing platforms, but the 
groups themselves are so numerous that they have failed to develop a 
single widely recognized standard.200 
Ironically, PSD2’s combination of deep but narrow data sharing 
obligations may well lead to less access to data than existed before 
passage of the regulation. The balance that PSD2 struck, after all, was 
to open up banks’ data to fintech companies but to pair that increased 
access with increased data security⎯what it referred to as strong 
customer authentication.201 Both of these requirements legally only 
applied to payments accounts, a very narrow slice of the financial 
market.202 But whereas it was easy to limit fintech companies’ access to 
 
 197. Here, for example, is how one fintech company described its experience in attempting to 
gain access to the various bank APIs it required: 
Many access procedures add weeks if not months to an already tight timeline. Some 
have an online registration form, but nothing happens once you submit. Others take 
weeks to inform us they’re still processing our request or need more information. And 
some require notarised copies of our licenses—a big surprise because we’ve been trying 
to access dummy data for testing, not real customer data for production (yet). The worst 
offenders have rejected us on the basis that we are a foreign third party that did not 
use a local provider (QTSP) for our eIDAS certificate. . . . Most of the documentation 
we’ve gotten access to is pretty awful, some lacking even the basic description of the 
available APIs and responses. A significant number of banks in southern Europe do not 
have English-language documentation, and even when a bank uses its native language, 
the documentation is often incomplete. 
The Sobering September Preview: Banks’ PSD2 APIs Far From Ready, TINK (June 14, 2019), 
https://tink.com/blog/2019/06/14/psd2-updated-sandbox [https://perma.cc/ECA5-3ZUW]. 
 198. See Red Hat Verticals Team, Open Banking — How to Leverage Open APIs for Competitive 
Advantage in Financial Services, REDHAT (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/open-
banking-%E2%80%94-how-leverage-open-apis-competitive-advantage-financial-services 
[https://perma.cc/VKC2-XZSL] (explaining how APIs can provide competitive advantages by 
fostering creativity, increasing brand awareness, and creating new revenue models). 
 199. See TINK, supra note 197 (providing negative feedback on the preparedness of banks’ APIs 
after testing over one hundred of them). 
 200. Efforts include OpenID’s Financial-Grade API specification, the U.K.’s Open Banking 
Implementation Entity standard, the Berlin Group’s NextGenPSD2 Framework, Financial Data 
Exchange’s Durable Data API standard, STET’s PSD2 API, and the PolishAPI Standard. Guthrie, 
supra note 195. 
 201. See Access vs. Security: Takeaways for U.S. Financial Institutions from the European 
PSD2 Open API Framework, DYKEMA: THE FIREWALL (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.thefirewall-
blog.com/2018/08/access-vs-security-takeaways-u-s-financial-institutions-european-psd2-open-
api-framework/ [https://perma.cc/NC4K-ETPE] (discussing tradeoffs of PSD2 for fintech 
companies and banks). 
 202. See Council Directive, 2015/2366, supra note 181, art. 36 (ensuring that payment 
institutions have access to credit institutions’ payment accounts services). 
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just payment-related financial data⎯it simply required an application 
program interface related to that data, and not other data⎯it was not 
so easy to limit strong customer authentication in this way. Customers 
would naturally be confused if the log-in process for their savings 
account only worked for their savings account at a bank, but not for 
their checking account, and vice versa. Instead, banks tended to adopt 
increased data security procedures for all customer accounts.203 These 
increased data procedures, in turn, made it more difficult for fintech 
companies to access financial data, at least if it was not payment 
related. Indeed, one common fintech technique, known as screen 
scraping, is widely believed to be prohibited under PSD2 regulations.204 
The result is a bifurcated system: better access to payment data, but 
worse access to everything else. This is surely a perverse result. 
2. United Kingdom 
In August 2016, after a longstanding investigation into the state 
of competition in the banking market, the U.K.’s Competition and 
Markets Authority (“CMA”) published a scathing report about the 
consumer banking industry. Among the more striking findings was the 
fact that only three percent of personal customers switched to new 
banks in any year, a shockingly low turnover rate.205 The report 
ultimately concluded that “older and larger banks . . . do not have to 
work hard enough to win and retain customers” and that “it is difficult 
for new and smaller providers to attract customers.”206 In order to 
remedy this problem, the CMA issued a comprehensive set of new rules 
aimed at improving competition and choice in the financial industry. 
 
 203. See Edward Corcoran, PSD2 and Strong Customer Authentication: New Rules Set to 
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the authentication requirements will likely make user experiences with banking more complex). 
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Confirmed in Finalised Standards, PINSENT MASONS: OUT-LAW (Nov. 28, 2017), 
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Dead, Long Live Screen Scraping, FINEXTRA (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.finextra.com/ 
blogposting/14793/screen-scraping-is-dead-long-live-screen-scraping [https://perma.cc/Q5W8-
Q5MC] (providing resources and explanations for determining when screen scraping is allowed). 
 205. Making Banks Work Harder for You, COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH. 1 (Aug. 9, 2016), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
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Among these was a set of “Open Banking” rules focused specifically on 
financial data.207   
The Open Banking rules created broad obligations on the U.K.’s 
nine largest banks to share consumer data in a secure and standardized 
format and share it with third parties as requested by consumers.208 
The financial data that is covered by the rules ranged from such basic 
information as branch and ATM locations to more detailed information 
such as transaction data and product prices.209 The CMA did not itself 
set the specific standards under which data sharing would occur, 
however. Instead, it set up a special purpose entity, the Open Banking 
Implementation Entity, for this task.210 The implementation entity is 
itself a private organization, but it is funded by the nine largest U.K. 
banks and overseen by the CMA, the Financial Conduct Authority, and 
the Treasury.211 The implementation entity has since issued detailed 
technical standards on how banks must handle financial data 
sharing.212 It has also been remarkably responsive to consumer 
feedback. After complaints that the initial standards issued by the 
entity were overly cumbersome, the entity revised the standards to 
simplify the consumer experience.213 The implementation entity is also 
tasked with managing the process for handling disputes and complaints 
related to open banking.214 Importantly, however, not every fintech 
company can gain access to the newly open and transparent financial 
data ecosystem. Instead, in order to access the open banking system, 
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Banks Support Open Banking Today?, BANKRATE, https://www.bankrate.com/uk/open-banking/ 
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Bank, Danske, Lloyds, and Nationwide. Rowland Manthorpe, What Is Open Banking and PSD2?, 
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/open-banking-cma-psd2-explained [https:// 
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 213. See Ana Badour, Domenic Presta & Arie van Wijngaarden, UK Open Banking 
Implementation Entity Report Released, MCCARTHY TETRAULT (July 26, 2019), 
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report-released [https://perma.cc/TX2R-XVPT]. 
 214. OPEN BANKING IMPLEMENTATION ENTITY, supra note 212, § 7. 
          
370 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2:327 
startups must first be approved by the Financial Conduct Authority.215 
The Financial Conduct Authority, thus, plays a gatekeeping role  
in accrediting and regulating third-party providers in the open  
banking industry.216 
It is surely too early to tell how open banking rules in the U.K. 
will ultimately change the consumer banking market. Rules continue 
to be issued and revised, and banks are still working on updating their 
platforms.217 There are signs, however, that the rules have introduced 
more competition into the financial market. As of November 2019, more 
than 150 companies had enrolled in the open banking framework and 
been approved by the Financial Conduct Authority.218 The companies 
range from large institutions, such as American Express and Barclays, 
to innovative startups, such as Revolut and Starling.219 The accounting 
firm PwC issued a report that estimated that more than thirty-three 
million people would sign up for open banking services by 2022.220 
At the same time, there are reasons for caution. Some observers 
have noted that banks’ open banking platforms are remarkably 
unreliable.221 In April 2019, the CMA reprimanded several banks for 
failing to meet their mobile app functionality requirements.222 And 
consumers have little awareness of the new efforts to facilitate data 
sharing: one survey found that only one in four people had heard of open 
banking and that, of those who had heard of it, only one in five knew 
what it meant.223    
 
 215. See Manthorpe, supra note 211 (“Only startups that have been approved by the Financial 
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https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/33870/is-open-banking-being-hobbled-by-outages [https:// 
perma.cc/MJ3W-7AQU]. 
 222. Peter Walker, CMA Reprimands Banks over Open Banking Delays, FSTECH (Apr. 9, 
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3. Australia 
In 2017, the Australian government began a multiyear effort to 
reform its laws on data governance, with a particular focus on the 
treatment of consumer data. In connection with this effort, Prime 
Minister Turnbull announced that the government would be 
introducing “Consumer Data Right” legislation across sectors to ensure 
the “very simple idea that the customer should own their own data.”224 
As part of this effort, the government commissioned a report on the 
state of the banking sector and how a consumer data right might be 
implemented.225 The resulting report concluded that aggressive new 
regulation would be required in the sector in order to stimulate 
innovation and competition, noting that “given the competitive 
advantages afforded to large incumbent firms by limiting the ability of 
customers to share their data with third parties, [private sector] 
initiatives alone seem unlikely to lead to a widespread increase in data 
sharing across the banking sector.”226 After a period of consultation, the 
Australian government eventually enacted the Consumer Data Right 
Bill into law in 2019.227  
Australia’s open banking rules are both broad and deep. They 
apply to a wide array of consumer data, including product data, 
customer data, account data, and transaction data.228 They also apply 
to a broad array of accounts, including credit and debit cards, deposit 
accounts, transaction accounts, and loans.229 And finally, they apply to 
a broad array of financial institutions—all deposit-taking institutions 
are obliged to comply with the open banking rules.230 In connection with 
these efforts, the Australian government has created a new “Data 
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Standards Body,” with authority to establish the technical standards 
for data sharing within the industry.231 
At the same time, in order to prevent a chaotic transition in the 
industry, Australia has created a series of stages in which progressively 
more burdensome requirements come into force. In the first stage, 
which began in January 2020, Australia’s four largest 
banks⎯Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the National Australia 
Bank, the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, and Westpac 
(the “Big Four”)⎯were required to publicly share product data about 
credit cards, debit cards, deposit accounts, and transaction accounts.232 
In the second stage, which came into force in February 2020, the Big 
Four are required to share consumer data about these accounts, as well 
as data for mortgage accounts.233 In later stages, data sharing 
requirements would expand to personal loan and other financial 
accounts and also apply to financial institutions beyond the Big Four.234 
Finally, Australia’s efforts to govern the handling and sharing of 
data go beyond just the financial industry. The Consumer Data Right 
Bill specified that the financial industry would be the first industry to 
be regulated, but that other industries would also come under its 
rules.235 In future years, it is expected that industry-specific rules will 
be developed for the energy, phone, and internet sectors.236   
While Australia’s open banking rules are still in development, 
with many of the most significant obligations yet to come into force, they 
give a sense of the range of approaches that are available to 
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governments crafting data autonomy in financial regulation. Unlike the 
E.U.’s PSD2 framework, Australia’s rules apply broadly to a wide range 
of financial products. Unlike the U.K.’s Open Banking framework, they 
extend not just to the largest banks, but also to smaller financial 
institutions. And finally, unlike either the E.U.’s or the U.K.’s 
regulatory frameworks, Australia’s data rules will eventually apply 
outside of just financial institutions, touching the vast majority of 
consumer data across sectors. It remains to be seen how effective the 
various approaches will prove to be. 
III. THE LIMITS OF DATA SHARING 
This Part highlights three types of risk that increased financial 
data sharing presents and sketches out some initial thoughts on how to 
limit these risks. First, data sharing raises a difficult question of 
consent, involving how to determine whether a consumer has truly 
agreed in an informed way to data sharing arrangements. Second, data 
sharing presents a problem of cartelization, regarding how to prevent 
financial institutions from colluding with each other. Finally, data 
sharing presents a problem of cost, regarding how to pay for the 
necessary technological upgrades. None of these problems are 
insurmountable, but they do involve tricky questions of law and 
economics that must not be ignored by policymakers. 
A. Consent 
Consent is at the foundation of data sharing.237 If consumers own 
their data, then they have the right to share it. Where they agree to 
allow others to use their data—whether for better map directions, more 
interactive social media accounts, or simply cheaper services—then 
data sharing should take place. Where they do not, then data sharing 
should be prohibited. Nearly all legislative efforts to improve the 
treatment of data have focused on the idea of consumer consent as the 
threshold requirement. For example, Europe’s GDPR makes it unlawful 
for companies to process data related to an individual unless the 
individual has given consent to such processing.238 The U.S.’s Cable 
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Communications Policy Act of 1984 prohibits cable companies from 
collecting personally identifiable information about individuals without 
their prior consent.239 Canada’s Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act requires companies to obtain consent from 
users before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information.240 The 
underlying assumption behind these requirements is that if companies 
are required to receive a consumer’s consent before using their  
data, then data will be used in ways that are more beneficial for  
the consumer. 
But if data autonomy begins with the concept of consent, then a 
lot hinges on precisely how consent is defined. If a fintech company 
offers a retirement savings tracker, and it includes in its terms and 
conditions a provision that it may use your data to “improve its 
services,” does this mean that it can sell your data to others in order to 
hire better engineers? If an AI startup that analyzes your payments 
history to improve your budget states that it may use your payments 
history to “develop new features,” does that mean that all of its 
employees can examine what you are buying from the grocery store, or 
on Amazon, or from the pharmacy, as long as they are working on a 
project related to it? And if you delete an account aggregator app like 
Mint from your phone, but fail to explicitly tell the company to stop 
accessing your data, can the company keep doing so in perpetuity?   
The problem here, of course, is that it is remarkably easy to get 
consumers to consent to anything on the internet. Numerous studies 
show that the vast majority of users fail to read the terms and 
conditions of apps and software.241 Consumers use so many different 
services now that it would be an overwhelming task to read and process 
the sometimes hundred-page agreements that companies impose on 
them⎯one study found that it would take the average user seventy-six 
work days just to read the terms of service of the websites they visit 
 
 239. 47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(1). 
 240. See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c 5, art 6.1 
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over the course of a year.242 Another found that ninety-eight percent of 
users failed to notice that the terms of service for a fictitious social 
networking service included a clause assigning their first born child to 
the network.243 And while the problem of consent in browsewrap and 
clickwrap agreements244 is well known among contract scholars, there 
are no quick fixes.245 This is more than just a theoretical problem, too. 
In 2019, it was discovered that Amazon workers were using Amazon’s 
Alexa devices to listen in on conversations in people’s homes⎯Amazon 
defended the practice as “help[ing] us train our speech recognition and 
natural language understanding systems, so Alexa can better 
understand your requests, and ensure the service works well for 
everyone.”246 In 2018, Google admitted that employees of third-party 
app developers could read people’s Gmail emails⎯the practice was 
defended as being consistent with the terms contained in user 
agreements.247 In 2018, the New York Times reported that Facebook 
was allowing Netflix and Spotify to read Facebook users’ private 
messages⎯Facebook defended the practice by arguing that the 
companies were simply service providers that allowed users to interact 
with one another better.248 
While there are no easy solutions here, a few important 
principles could help reduce the problem of consent.249 First, consent 
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should be defined as narrowly as possible in order to eliminate the sort 
of broad catchall provisions that are too common in user agreements 
today. One model here is the GDPR’s definition of consent, which 
requires a user’s agreement to be “freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous.”250 It also considers the context of the consent: in 
clarifying comments, the GDPR states, “[w]hen assessing whether 
consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether . . . the 
performance of a contract . . . is conditional on consent to the  
processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of 
that contract.”251  
Second, consent should be easily revoked, either by creating a 
presumption that the deletion of an app amounts to a revocation of 
consent or through a prescribed period of time after which renewed 
consent must be given. This would help prevent fintech companies from 
continuing to gather data after a user stops using the service.252  
Finally, given the integral importance of the financial sector to 
people’s lives, policymakers should impose more mandatory, rather 
than default, rules on the sector. No matter how narrow or limited our 
concept of consent, consumers cannot be expected to have the resources 
or sophistication necessary to forecast and understand all the potential 
risks from data sharing. Therefore, data autonomy in financial 
regulation requires a robust set of mandatory rules governing data 
sharing, from which parties may not depart even if the consumer agrees 
to them. This Article has already highlighted a few of these⎯from 
cybersecurity to access to interoperability⎯but more will be needed, 
particularly where there is a significant risk of consumer harm. Some 
examples might include prohibiting broad indemnification clauses from 
consumers, or waivers of the right to sue in court, or unnecessarily 
expansive data-use provisions. The CFPB’s guidance on consumer 
protection principles in data sharing provides a useful summary of the 
key areas of concern.253 
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B. Antitrust 
Increased data sharing in the financial industry also raises 
several antitrust-related concerns.254 The purpose of antitrust law is to 
ensure that companies do not engage in anticompetitive conduct.255 
While the classic case of such conduct would be the creation of a 
monopoly, there are many other ways in which ostensible competitors 
can restrict competition among themselves. These include such 
practices as price fixing (where competitors agree to sell their goods or 
services at a set price or on set terms), bid rigging (where competitors 
manipulate prices in a competitive bidding process), and market 
allocation (where competitors divide particular sectors of a market 
among themselves).256 All of these problematic behaviors are facilitated, 
and indeed premised, on information sharing between competing 
companies.257 And as the opportunities for such information sharing 
increase, so too do the risks. 
In some ways, of course, increased data sharing should reduce 
concerns about competition in the financial industry. The very purpose 
of open banking is to incentivize competition and innovation in the 
sector.258 When scholars discuss the antitrust concerns raised by big 
data, they typically focus on the problems that are generated when 
large players monopolize information and thus make it difficult for 
smaller players to compete with them.259 By forcing large players to 
share this data with others, data autonomy can mitigate this problem. 
Even if large banks possess more data than fintech companies, fintech 
companies can gain access to the data through data sharing platforms 
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and thus should have lower costs of entry. As a result, data sharing 
provides a helpful way to prevent companies from gaining or abusing 
dominant positions in the market. 
But while data autonomy might help reduce the concerns over 
data monopolization, it simultaneously raises concerns about data 
collusion. Data collusion might occur in any number of ways. If financial 
institutions can see precisely what their competitors are doing, in terms 
of interest rates, loan terms, fees, customer base, and other sensitive 
areas, they may be able to reach agreements, either tacit or explicit, 
about accepted behaviors in the industry. They might agree to increase 
mortgage rates, or decrease the interest paid on checking accounts, or 
maintain set transaction fees. The very data that is so valuable to 
consumers, and that is essential to opening up financial innovation, is 
also quite useful for the purpose of cartelization. And, if used in ways 
that are difficult to detect, data sharing between competitors could 
provide an impetus for financial institutions to chill competition. 
Indeed, the FTC provides the following guidance to companies about 
the circumstances in which information exchanges between competitors 
become problematic: 
The reasonableness of an information exchange depends mainly on the nature of the 
information that is shared. The sharing of information relating to price, cost, output, 
customers, or strategic planning is more likely to be of competitive concern than the 
sharing of less competitively sensitive information. . . . And the sharing of company-
specific data is more likely to raise concerns than the sharing of aggregated data of 
multiple firms that does not permit identification of information by company.260 
One of the key considerations that the FTC takes into account 
when determining whether an information exchange is likely to harm 
competition is whether the exchange “reduc[es] uncertainty about a 
rival’s product offerings, prices, and strategic plans.”261 
Again, this is more than just a hypothetical risk. In recent years, 
financial institutions have been charged with major price fixing 
violations in a range of areas, from the LIBOR interest rate,262 to the 
prices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds,263 to the interest rate on 
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Treasury bonds,264 to the fees at ATMs.265 The ready availability of data 
on competitors’ prices, terms, and conditions will make such 
problematic behaviors both easier to engage in and harder to detect.266 
Even if there are no formal agreements to engage in price fixing or 
similar behavior, competitors might use pricing algorithms that lead to 
similar results.267 Regulators will need to be attuned to these risks. 
Two features of data sharing regulation could help reduce these 
risks. First, under any plausible version of a data sharing rule for 
finance, financial institutions can only share consumer financial data 
with the third parties that the consumer consents to.268 Only authorized 
parties can gain access to consumer financial data, and thus broad 
information sharing between competitors would continue to be 
prohibited even under a data sharing framework. This rule is not 
perfect, of course, because it may well be that a consumer voluntarily 
shares financial data from one financial institution with another 
competing financial institution. Indeed, large banks have been some of 
the biggest investors in the fintech sector in recent years.269 Even if only 
a small portion of consumers overlap in financial institutions, 
companies could gain significant insight into competitors’ practices. 
Second, data sharing regulations must make clear that financial 
institutions may only use data for the purposes that the consumer 
explicitly authorizes. If a consumer shares loan information from one 
financial institution with another firm for the purpose of optimizing the 
timing of loan payments, the receiving firm should not be permitted to 
use that information to, say, determine the prices of its own loans. This 
may well mean that, for large financial institutions with many different 
business divisions, companies will need to set up Chinese walls that 
prevent teams in one division from seeing the data that other divisions 
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receive. Siloing information is not perfectly effective, of course, but 
there is evidence that it can reduce opportunistic use of information.270 
Needless to say, these proposals will not resolve the antitrust 
concerns raised by data sharing in the financial world. Regulators will 
need to devise ways to identify and sanction firms that attempt to use 
consumer data for anticompetitive purposes. Similarly, they will need 
to clarify the kinds of information exchanges that are permitted and the 
range of behaviors that are not. Data sharing regulation must not be 
used as an excuse for financial collusion. 
C. Cost 
Another major issue created by an open banking framework is 
the problem of cost. Forcing financial institutions to adopt new data 
sharing technologies will impose substantial costs on them. It is hoped 
that these costs are more than compensated for by the benefits of 
increased consumer options and the incentives to create innovative new 
financial services. But those benefits are amorphous and long-term, 
while the costs are direct and immediate. And while the costs may  
be easily borne by large actors, smaller actors will be more  
burdened. Finding ways to pay for these expenses will be important to 
ensuring compliance. 
As an initial matter, it may be helpful to examine just how 
expensive data sharing is for financial institutions. It is important to 
recognize that the transition to a data-sharing-enabled financial sector 
will involve expense. In the U.K., the funding needs of the Open 
Banking Implementation Entity were £28 million in 2017 and rose to 
£39 million in 2018.271 Some estimate that the total cost of the 
transition could exceed £100 million.272 The Australian bank Westpac 
estimated that implementing Australia’s open banking platform would 
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cost the bank between $150 and $200 million Australian dollars (or 
approximately $100 to $140 million U.S. dollars).273 These are not 
outsized sums for the largest U.S. banks—J.P. Morgan had revenues of 
$30 billion just in the second quarter of 2019⎯but they would be 
substantial for many smaller regional and community banks.274   
Much of these costs, however, stem from the process of 
developing the appropriate technological and regulatory standards 
through which financial data sharing will take place.275 Once these 
standards are in place, the actual implementation of them for any given 
bank becomes much simpler. An estimate from the U.K.’s Open Data 
Institute concluded that the cost of implementing API access for a 
typical bank would be less than £1 million and probably in the “low-to-
mid hundreds of thousands.”276 While compliance costs might increase 
in a data sharing environment, these estimates suggest the overall cost 
from a technical standpoint would be reasonable.   
Moreover, the transition costs could be lowered by phasing in the 
regulatory obligations of data sharing over time. Just as Australia has 
structured its data sharing rules to initially only apply to the largest 
banks, and only to a portion of their data, the United States might 
phase in data sharing obligations to first apply to large banks (such as 
the “Big Four” of JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and 
Citibank), and later to smaller ones. This approach would have the dual 
advantage of requiring the initial costs of transition to be borne by the 
financial institutions that have the greatest capacity to bear them,  
and also opening up the benefits of data sharing to a large share  
of consumers. 
The larger costs, of course, are not so much the initial setup costs 
of implementing data sharing platforms, but rather the long-term 
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startups.277 Forcing banks to share data with companies that are 
potentially competitors creates a threat to the business models of 
financial institutions. Fintech companies could erode profit margins by 
alerting customers to better investments elsewhere or taking control 
over more financial transactions. Financial institutions might need to 
find new ways to generate revenue or they might become less profitable. 
Forcing banks to bear the cost of creating accessible technological 
platforms (such as APIs) would allow them to spread the cost over all of 
its business lines and customers, rather than offload it onto the 
consumers that need the access in the first place, but it would still  
be costly.  
Yet the mere fact that data sharing could change the business 
model of financial institutions is not sufficient to conclude that doing so 
is undesirable. There are many behaviors in the financial markets that 
might be profitable for financial institutions to do in the absence of 
regulation, but that are prohibited, either for reasons of fairness, or 
efficiency or stability. The important question to ask is whether the 
regulation encourages free and fair competition in a way that will 
benefit consumers. This Article argues that it does.   
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the clarion call of data privacy has 
led policymakers and scholars to ignore the broader importance of data. 
The emphasis on protecting consumer data from exposure has created 
a situation in which consumers are prevented from being able to access, 
use, and share their data in convenient and transparent ways. As a 
result, innovation and competition suffers. The financial sector provides 
a particularly striking example of this problem. Large asymmetric 
information and search and switch costs make it hard for consumers to 
identify and use better financial products. Banks can thus hold up 
customers with higher prices, worse services, and fewer options without 
facing strong competition. While fintech companies could potentially 
resolve these problems, they face one nearly insurmountable barrier: 
they lack access to the financial data they need. And given the 
inefficiencies in the market, it is unlikely that purely private sector 
efforts can overcome this problem. Therefore, this Article argues, we 
must recast financial regulation in a way that focuses on data 
 
 277. See Laura Brodsky, Chris Ip & Tobias Lundberg, Open Banking’s Next Wave: Perspectives 
from Three Fintech CEOs, MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/ 
industries/financial-services/our-insights/open-bankings-next-wave-perspectives-from-three-
fintech-ceos [https://perma.cc/R5FD-FUF8] (discussing the ways in which fintech innovation is 
forcing banks to produce new products at low cost). 
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autonomy. Data autonomy will require clear rules on data ownership,  
data access, and data liability, and it will require renewed attention to 
the way that data is protected. While these changes will not be easy or 
cheap, they hold tremendous potential to drive innovation and 
competition for the benefit of consumers.  
 
